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INSURANCE RATE REGULATION AND THE
COURTS: NORTH CAROLINA'S
"BATTLEGROUND" BECOMES A
"HORNBOOK"
ARCH

T. ALLEN, lilt

Since John Ingram assumed office as the North CarolinaInsurance Commissionerin 1973, there has been a runningbattle in the courts between Commissioner Ingram and the insurance industry over the scope of the Commissioner's
rate-making authority. Despite the enactment of the 1977 Rating Law, which
was intendedto resolve the conflict, the battle in the courts has continued,resulting in a virtual "hornbook"of administrativelaw doctrine. Mr. Allen examines
the "hornbook,"noting the North CarolinaSupreme Court'spleaforfurtherlegislationin the areaandpraisingthe courtfor its adherence to thepresentlegislative standards.
I.

INTRODUCTION

For nearly three-quarters of a century, there has been some state regulation of insurance rates by statute. The constitutional cornerstone for this regulation was set in 1914 in German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis' when the
United States Supreme Court upheld Kansas' legislative regulation of fire insurance rates 2 as a proper means of securing rates that would be "reasonable"
both to the insurer and the insured. 3 Upon that cornerstone grew a structure
of state regulation. The structure remained limited in scope, however, cover-4
ing only certain lines of insurance and haying footings in only a few states,
until it was "shaken to its foundations"' 5 in 1944 by United States v. SouthEastern UnderwritersAssociation.6 The Supreme Court's application of the
Sherman Act to insurance industry rate-making promised an extensive rebuilding of the state regulatory structure, 7 which was accommodated by Con" Member, Allen, Steed and Allen, P.A., Raleigh, North Carolina. B.S., 1962; J.D. with
honors, 1965, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author and his firm were counsel
of record in many of the cases discussed in this article. The views expressed are solely those of the
author and all matters discussed are of public record.
1. 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
2. "The first law to regulate property-casualty rates was adopted by Kansas in 1909." F.
CRANE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE RATE REGULATION 55 (1961). For a discussion of other, earlier

insurance regulation, including anti-compact laws, see id at 51-54.

3. 233 U.S. at 417.
4. McCullough, InsuranceRates in the Courts-Part1, 1961 INS. L.J. 381 [hereinafter cited as
McCullough I]. See also McCullough, Insurance Rates in the Courts-Part11, 1961 INS. L.J. 475
[hereinafter cited as McCullough II].
5. Donovan, State Regulation of Insurance, 1956 INS. L.J. 11, 11.
6. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
7. Id at 590 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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gress' 1945 enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption of state8
regulated insurance from federal antitrust statutes.
From the new "federal foundation ' 9 for state regulation, the next decade
provided unprecedented developments.10 These included the industry's attempt to become exempt from federal antitrust statutes by advocating state
regulation of "the very lifeblood of the industry-what it may sell and the
price it may charge." 1 ' After that decade and the commencement of extensive
state regulation, one commentator concluded that state regulators "generally
have exercised commendable discretion in the administration of the new
2
power granted to them."'
Early exercise of this power caused few court confrontations. 13 The call
to the courts came more often in the 1960s.14 At the end of that decade, one
court recognized the limited role of the judiciary in rate-making: "the making
of rates for the future is legislative. .

.,

[not] adjudicatory."'I

Exercise of that

delegated legislative power by state regulators nevertheless can result in judicial review of the regulatory action. Regulatory resistance to rate increases in
the inflationary era of the 1970s and early 1980s has increasingly confronted
16
the courts with insurance rate cases.
Compounding this national trend in North Carolina was the approach to
insurance rate regulation taken by John Randolph Ingram as Commissioner
of Insurance.' 7 After one of Commissioner Ingram's first efforts to impose his
"own ideas of structural reformation"' 8 was vacated in a court challenge by
insurance companies, 19 he publicly denounced the companies for making
"North Carolina a battleground rather than a proving ground," warned that
they were "fighting a losing battle," and vowed that "we will win the war." 20
The subsequent "numerous North Carolina appellate decisions. . . rebuffing
8. McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015

(1976)).
9. Donovan, supra note 5, at 12.
10. Id
11. Id at 11.
12. Id at 14.
13. 'There have been relatively few insurance rate cases. . . . The number of cases does
seem to be on the rise, since 1950." McCullough 1, supra note 4, at 382.
14. See, ag., Pennsylvania Ins. Dept. v. City of Philadelphia, 196 Pa. Super. Ct. 221, 173
A.2d 811 (1961).

15. Carroll v. Barnes, 169 Colo.277, 283, 455, P.2d 644, 647 (1969). See also, e.g., Insurance
Serv. Office v. Whaland, 117 N.H. 712, 717, 378 A.2d 743, 746 (1977) ("Rate-making is not a
judicial function.").
16. See, ag., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 15 Pa. Commw. Ct. 24, 324 A.2d

878 (1974).
17. The office of Commissioner of Insurance, provided in the state constitution without specified duties, is elective. N.C. CONsT. art. III, § 7(1).
18. Roddis, Limited Omnipotence: The Bases andLimitationsof the Powers ofInsuranceRegulators, 13 FORUM 386, 393 (1978).
19. State ex rel Comn'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 19 N.C. App
548, 199 S.E.2d 479, cert. denied, 284 N.C. 424, 200 S.E.2d 663 (1973).
20. Reproduced Record on Appeal, at p. 108, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ingram,
290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498 (1976) (stipulating to Exhibit 27, "Chronology of Commissioner of
Insurance's press releases and speeches"); Raleigh News & Observer, Oct. 12, 1973 at 25, col. 4.
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the aggressive regulatory outreach" of Commissioner Ingram have provided,
according to a former California Insurance Commissioner, "a virtual 'Hornbook' of administrative law doctrine on the scope of exercise of the commissioner's powers with respect to rating processes. '2 1 North Carolina courts
became "beset with the burden of reviewing the Commissioner's disapproval
of virtually every" proposed rate increase, and the process was "stalemated by
a seemingly endless cycle."'22 Despite the enactment of the North Carolina
1977 Rating Law,23 reform legislation intended "to eliminate this regulatory
impasse," the adjudicatory trend did not abate. 24 The North Carolina
Supreme Court in 1980 reversed and vacated four of Commissioner Ingram's
orders that disapproved rate increases under the 1977 Rating Law, finding
"multiple errors of such magnitude as to make remand futile." 25
Regardless of any regulatory "shambles, ' 26 these North Carolina cases do
constitute a "virtual hombook." Indeed, one of the 1980 cases has been called
a "virtual new hornbook of administrative law for North Carolina." 27 This
survey of those North Carolina cases, while avoiding technical analysis of
rate-making and argument over the efficacy of either Commissioner Ingram or
any particular statutory scheme of rate regulation, relates the court's responses
to these regulatory confrontations; it reviews the "Hornbook."
II.

A.

PREFACE TO THE NORTH CAROLINA "HORNBOOK"--A
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

An Overview of Rate-Making

Different lines of insurance are rated separately. 28 Pricing life insurance
differs from rate-making for casualty insurance, which in turn varies to some
degree among its different lines.29 Each line of insurance presents its special
21. Roddis, supra note 18, at 393 n.15.
22. State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 44 N.C. App. 191, 194-95,
261 S.E.2d 671, 674 (1979), mod/fed and a'd.,300 N.C. 485, 269 S.E.2d 602 (1980).
23. Law of June 30, 1977, ch. 828, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1119 (codified in various sections of
N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 58 (Cum. Supp. 1979)).
24. Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 44 N.C. App. 191, 195, 261 S.E.2d
671, 674 (1979), modfled and afrd., 300 N.C. 485, 269 S.E.2d 602 (1980).
25. State ex rel Comn'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 485, 269 S.E.2d 602
(1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Insurance Case IV]; State ex. rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 474, 269 S.E.2d 595 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Insurance Case
III]; State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 160, 269 S.E.2d 538
(1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Insurance Case IM]; State exrel Comnm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina
Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 459, 269 S.E.2d 547, 607 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Insurance
Case 1].
26. See Raleigh News & Observer, July 17, 1980, at 4, col. 1.
27. Holley, State v. North CarolinaRate Bureau, CAMPBELL LAW OBSERVER, Aug. 29, 1980,
at 4, col. 1.
28. See Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins., 359 Mass. 111, 268 N.E.2d 144 (1971);
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 358 Mass. 387, 265 N.E.2d 90 (1970); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 358 Mass. 272, 263 N.E.2d 698 (1970).
29. See C. KULP & J. HALL, CASUALTY INSURANCE 765-89 (1968).
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pricing problems, 30 and texts and expert testimony detail different rate-making
31
methodologies.
A common industry approach to proposing rates, however, is to allow for
underwriting profit apart from investment income. In the first reported case to
discuss underwriting profit, Bullion v. Aetna InsuranceCompany,3 2 the Arkansas Supreme Court distinguished the underwriting and investment undertakings of insurance companies, and made the classic characterization "that
underwriting profit or loss is arrived at by deducting from earned premiums
all incurred losses and incurred expenses. '' 33 Individual companies or rate
bureaus periodically propose prospective rates planned to produce sufficient
premium income to provide for anticipated losses and expenses as well as for
underwriting profit and contingencies. 34 Records and statistics are maintained, and according to one commentator, rate levels can be adjusted "by
fairly simple arithmetic." 35 Another commentator finds that "few financial
subjects are more complex" than insurance profits produced through the ratemaking process. 3 6 Nevertheless, "in thousands of cases that attract no particular attention, the above process works smoothly from day to day, and there is
37
no occasion for litigation."
When litigation over rate-making has arisen, courts generally have
avoided technical analyses of methodology and have adopted overviews of the
rate-making process. The North Carolina Supreme Court's comments in its
earliest encounter with rate-making are typical:
[T]he entire procedure contemplates a looking to the future.
The policy contracts fix in advance the premiums to be charged
therefor by the issuing company. For the premium so fixed at the
inception of the policy, the company contracts that it will pay [for a
property loss, within the policy's limits]. [Tihe problem for the rate
maker is to determine what amount, collected as premiums at the
inception of the policies hereafter to be issued, will enable the company (1) to pay losses to be incurred during the life of such policies
30. See, eg., Mortgage Guar. Ins. Corp. v. Langdon, 634 P.2d 509 (Wyo. 1981) (involving
mortgage guaranty insurance, referred to by the court as "unique" insurance).
31. See, eg., Order dated December 20, 1979, adopting Proposed Findings and Recommendations, In re Automobile Insurance Territorial Classifications-Effect on Rates, California Insurance Commissioner, reproduced in II ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COsT-BASED PRICING VERSUS SOCIAL/POLITICAL PRIcINo (1980). "Many view insurance ratemaking as being a mystical, arcane process which can only be practiced (and/or understood) by the initiated. Actually, the process itself is quite simple although the procedures used
can be complicated." Id at 6-7. "Two texts generally recognized as providing a good treatment of
ratemaking procedures include... C. Kulp & J. Hall [supra note 29] and 0. Michelbacher & N.
Roos, Multiple-Line Insurers, Their Nature and Operation (1970)." Id
32. 151 Ark. 519, 237 S.W. 716 (1922).
33. Id at 526, 237 S.W. at 718.
34. McCullough I, supra note 4, at 382.
35. Id
36. Loomis,.ANon-Boring Look at Insurance,FORTUNE, March 8, 1982, at 105, 106. Courts
also have viewed the process as complex. See, e.g., Insurance Serv. Office v. Whaland, 117 N.H.
712, 716, 378 A.2d 743, 746 (1977) (court noting "that rate-making is a technical and highly complex process requiring much expertise"). Id
37. McCullough I, supra note 4, at 383.
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of the company, and
. . ., (2) to pay other proper operating expenses
38
(3) to retain a "fair and reasonable profit."
B. Reasonable Rates andEarly Cases
After the United States Supreme Court upheld the Kansas statutory
scheme for "reasonable" rates in GermanAlliance InsuranceCo. v. Lewis,39 the
Kansas Supreme Court examined the reasonableness of the regulated rates in
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Travis.4° A referee had determined that reasonable
rates included an allowance for underwriting profit and that five percent of the
premiums was a fair underwriting profit.4 1 On appeal, the court first split on
the meaning of "reasonable."'4 2 On rehearing, 43 the court restated the question: "Upon what are plaintiffs entitled to make a reasonable profit-the value
of their capital stock allocated to this state, or their premiums?" 44 The court,
relying on what it deemed to be analogous utility cases, held that proposed
profit should be based on present capital and surplus, not on a percentage of
premiums.45 It noted that there was no precedent and that only two other
insurance rate cases had reached state supreme courts before 1927.46 In the
earlier of those two cases, Bullion v. Aetna Insurance Co. ,47 a statute set the
maximum underwriting profit at five percent, 4 8 thus leaving no controversy
over the definition of "reasonable" profit. In the second case, Aetna Insurance
Co. v. Hyde,49 the court applied a statute providing for "a reasonable profit"
and approved a profit of "five per cent on the underwriting business done,
with three per cent additional for conflagration hazard."'50 Ail three of these
opinions implicitly approved the "reasonable" standard.
The sufficiency of the "reasonable" standard was challenged in State v.
Whitman,51 a 1928 case concerning the constitutionality of a statute that pro38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

In re N.C. Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 275 N.C. 15, 32, 165 S.E.2d 207, 219 (1969).
233 U.S. 389 (1914).
121 Kan. 802, 257 P. 337 (1926), rev'don rehearing, 124 Kan. 350, 259 P. 1068 (1927).
Id at 816, 257 P. at 338-40.
Id at 811, 257 P. at 338.
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Baker, 124 Kan. 350, 259 P. 1068 (1927).
Id at 355, 259 P. at 1071.

45. Id at 356-69, 259 P. at 1071-77.
46. Id at 355-56, 259 P. at 1071.
47. 151 Ark. 519, 237 S.W. 716 (1922).
48. Id at 521, 237 S.W. at 716.
49. 315 Mo. 113, 285 S.W. 65 (1926), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 440 (1928). See also Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Hyde, 34 F.2d 185 (W.D. Mo. 1929).
50. 315 Mo. at 128, 285 S.W. at 68.
51. 196 Wis. 472, 220 N.E. 929 (1928). See also Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 34 F.2d 185 (W.D.
Mo. 1929); Massachusetts Medical Serv. v. Commissioner of Ins., 344 Mass. 335, 182 N.E.2d 298
(1962); Insurance Serv. Office v. Whaland, 117 N.H. 712, 378 A.2d 743 (1977); Old Republic Life
Ins. Co. v. Thacher, 12 N.Y.2d 48, 186 N.E.2d 554, 234 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1962); Old Republic Life
Ins. Co. v. Wilder, 9 N.Y.2d 524, 175 N.E.2d 147, 215 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1961); Long v. National
Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, 209 Tenn. 435, 354 S.W.2d 255 (1962); Cosmo Life Ins. Co. v.
State Bd. of Ins., 319 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Fire Ins. Rating Bureau v. Rogan, 4 Wis.
2d 558, 91 N.W.2d 372 (1958). The Jhitman case was followed recently in Mortgage Guar. Ins.
Corp. v. Langdon, 634 P.2d 509 (Wyo. 1981). But f Daniel v. Tyrell & Garth Inv. Co., 172 Tex.
213, 93 S.W.2d 372 (1936).
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hibited charging any rate "which is unreasonable or which discriminates unfairly between risks."'52 The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the statutory
standards, and further held that the legislature may delegate to the Commissioner of Insurance the "power to determine whether rates are unreasonable
'53
and discriminatory, and ... [the] power to establish a reasonable rate."
Courts in other early decisions impliedly approved the "reasonable" standard by applying statutory variations of that theme. Some statutes prescribed
an underwriting profit allowance.5 4 Others only provided for rates that would
"produce a fair and reasonable profit."5 5 In all of the early cases except the
Kansas Aetna case, however, the underwriting profit approach, rather than
return on capital, *wasspecified by statute, 56 agreed to by the parties, 57 or sustained by the courts. 58 Whatever the context or approach, courts concurred
that the objective was "reasonableness from the viewpoint of all parties
59
affected."
Although unseen in the early cases, another strand wove through the web
of the "reasonable" rate standard. The significance of the standard soon
would surpass its role in the delegation of state legislative power and its seeming subscription to the underwriting profit approach. The standard became a
thin string that secured state-regulation immunity from federal antitrust
statutes.
C. Antitrust andIts Aftermath
To understand rate cases, "it is necessary to trace the history of the business of insurance and the events leading up to the passage of the McCarran
Act."'60 Some early cases chronicled the initial, limited state regulation 6' prevailing under the constitutional precedent that the issuance of an insurance
policy was not a transaction within the commerce clause.62 Free from federal
52. 196 Wis. at 476 n.l, 220 N.W. at 931 n.l.
53. Id at 513,220 N.W. at 944.
54. See, eg., New Orleans Real Estate Bd. v. Insurance Comm'n, 177 La. 1091, 150 So. 286
(1933).
55. See, eg., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth exrel. State Corp. Comm'n, 160 Va. 698, 169
S.E. 859 (1933).
56. See Bullion v. Aetna Ins. Co., 151 Ark. 519, 237 S.W. 716 (1922); New Orleans Real
Estate Bd. v. Commissioner, 177 La. 1091, 150 So. 286 (1933).
57. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 315 Mo. 113, 285 S.W. 65 (1926), cert. denied,275 U.S. 440
(1928).

5$. Compare Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel State Corp. Comm'n, 160 Va. 698, 169
S.E. 859 (1933), with American Druggists' Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 275, 110 S.E.2d 509
(1959).

59. American Alliance Ins. Co. v. Board of Ins. Comm'rs, 126 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939) (a premium tax case, not a rate case).
60. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73, 81 (E.D.N.C. 1965), at'd, 361 F.2d 870 (4th
Cir.), cer. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
61. See, eg., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth exrel State Corp. Comm'n, 160 Va. 698, 169
S.E. 859 (1933).
62. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 502-12 (1913); Hooper v.
California, 155 U.S. 648, 653 (1895); Paul v. Commonwealth, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868).
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antitrust restrictions on commerce, 63 some insurers, especially casualty compa-

nies, exchanged information and participated in cooperative rate-making
through regional underwriting associations. 64 The Supreme Court in United

States v. South-Eastern UnderwritersAssociation65 overruled that precedent in
1944, effectively preempting state regulation of insurance rates and prohibiting

cooperative rate-making by applying the federal antitrust laws to alleged
con66
spiracies to fix insurance rates and monopolize the sale of insurance.

South-Eastern Underwriters caused industry "consternation and confusion."' 67 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners proposed

Congressional action to restore state regulation of insurance. 68 Enacted essentially as proposed, 69 the McCarran-Ferguson Act7" effectively exempted the

state-regulated insurance business from the key federal antitrust acts by pro[only] to the extent
viding that those acts apply "to the business of insurance
71
that such business is not regulated by state law."
Concern continued, however, and one critic observed that "no state had
regulated rates for every coverage or regulated every cooperative activity suffi-

ciently to meet the requirements of the McCarran-Ferguson law."'72 Cooperative rate-making through the exchange of experience data by rating
organizations and companies could have been curtailed under the antitrust

laws. 73 "Confronted by so great a crisis," 74 the insurance industry, collectively
through an All-Industry Committee cooperating with a committee of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, proposed a model bill for
state rate-regulatory legislation.75 Despite differences among companies and
agents over requirements of "prior approval" or "subsequent disapproval" of
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).

64. See Donovan, supra note 5, at 11.
65. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
66. Id at 539-53.
67. C. KULP & J. HALL, supra note 29, at 964.

68. Id
69. "The Commissioners had proposed exemption of cooperative rate-making when stateregulated, and of certain other cooperative practices, but Congress would not allow this concession." Id
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976). See, eg., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531
(1978). As stated in State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962):
When we held in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533, that
the modern business of insurance was "interstate commerce," we put it in a category
which Congress could regulate and which, if our prior decisions controlled, could not in
some respects be regulated by the States, even in the absence of federal regulation. . . .
Congress promptly passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act... which provided that the
regulation and taxation of insurance should be left to the States, without restriction by
reason of the Commerce Clause. Subsequently, by force of the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
we upheld the continued taxation and regulation by the States of interstate insurance
transactions.
Id at 452 (citations omitted).
72. C. KULP & J. HALL, supra note 29, at 965 (noting J. O'Connor, J. Am. Ass'N. UNIV.
TEAcHERS OF INS., March 1948, at 92).
73. See C. KULP & J. HALL, supra note 29, at 965.
74. Id at 966.
75. Id
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proposed rates and "bureau" or "nonbureau" rates, 76 the model legislation
succeeded, and within a few years after enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson
77
Act nearly every state had some statutory rate regulation.
Rate regulation resulting from this history and reflecting the model bill
standards has survived antitrust and federal preemption attacks. In the leading case, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lanier,78 which arose in North Carolina, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals traced this history and held that the bureauproposed, commissioner-approved mandatory rates resulted from valid state
action immune from and not preempted by the antitrust statutes. 79
The North Carolina adaptation of the model legislation essentially incorporated the All-Industry Committee standards.80 Underlying the standards is
the All-Industry Committee's intended "broad discretionary power," 8' limited
only by the "major substantive rate standards" proposed by the All-Industry
Committee and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.8 2 As
an antitrust aftermath, in North Carolina and elsewhere, "[a]ll of the laws,
regardless of the words chosen, required that rates be reasonable, adequate,
not excessive, and not unfairly discriminatory."8 3
D.

Case Interpretationof the Statutory Standards

Of the few early cases applying the standards, some are especially instructive in illustrating the breadth of the rate-regulators' discretionary powers. In
Jordan v.American EagleFireInsuranceCo. 8 4 the standards directed the regulator "to adjust rates only after finding existing rates to be excessive, inadequate or unreasonable. 8 5 In addition, he had to give consideration "to a
reasonable profit."'8 6 Jordan involved an action to enjoin enforcement of an
order fixing fire insurance rates. The order was based upon a purported allowance of 5 percent underwriting profit, but the companies alleged that it would
76. "Prior approval" requires the approval of a rate or rate structure by the supervisory of-

ficial before the rate goes into effect. "Subsequent approval" allows insurers and insurer bureaus

to file rates effective immediately, subject to the commissioner's right to disapprove within a stipulated number of days. Ultimately, the majority of laws adopted were of the subsequent disap-

proval type. Id
77. More than thirty states enacted laws similar to the model bill. Id
78. 242 F. Supp. 73 (E.D.N.C. 1965), a]/'d,361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,385 U.S.
930 (1966). See also North Little Rock Transp. Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 85 F. Supp. 961
(E.D. Ark. 1949), aft'd, 181 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,340 U.S. 823 (1950). But c, e.g.,
United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ga.
1979), aft'd, 672 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982) (rate bureau's practices of collective rate coordination per
se violations of Sherman Act).
79. 361 F.2d at 871-73.
80. Id

81. C. KuLP & J. HALL, supra note 29, at 989 (quoting All Industry Comm., Casualty and
Surety Rate-Regulatory Bill, Explanatory Memorandum (October 1946)).

82. Id (quoting National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Casualty and Surety

Rate Regulatory Bill (1946)).

83. McCullough I, supra note 4, at 381.
84. 169 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1948).

85. Id at 289.
86. Id
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produce an average underwriting loss of 2.5 percent and was thus confisca-

tory.8 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-

manded because the trial court had failed to make a complete determination

and findings of fact regarding the alleged confiscation. 88 The court of appeals,

however, did not question the statutory standards, and essentially equated
them with a constitutional test requiring sufficient revenue for costs "and suffi-

cient return to the equity owner to assure financial integrity of the enterprise,
so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital." 89 After expressing concern

over the constitutional concepts controlling the confiscation contention, a concern arising from the Supreme Court's conclusions in Aetna Insurance Co. v.

Hyde,90 the court added dictum questioning whether the determination of
confiscation should be by consideration of the several companies separately or
by the general experience of all of the companies. 9 1

That constitutional question and the implicit practical problem for rate-

making have survived. 92 Subsequent cases have clarified somewhat the con-

stitutional concept of confiscatory rates, distinct from the application of the
statutory standards. 93 The standards have survived application to statutorily-

compelled bureau rates made on an aggregate industrywide basis, 94 rates of
independent companies, 95 and rates under more recent "open competition"
laws. 96

Intertwined in the thread of statutory interpretation, however, is a

cord of constitutional concern. As expressed in Massachusetts Bonding & In-

surance Co. v. Commissioner,97 the standards impose "the duty of fixing a rate
that lies somewhere between the lowest rate that is not confiscatory and the
87. Id at 284-85.
88. Id at 293.
89. Id at 289.
90. 275 U.S. 440 (1928). See also Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner of Ins., 359 Mass.
111, 268 N.E.2d 144 (1971) (construing Commissioner's rate fixing based on combined experience
of all companies doing business).
91. 169 F.2d at 293.
92. "The Jordan case was subsequently settled and the dilemma still remains." McCullough
I, supra note 4, at 386.
93. See Massachusetts Auto. Rating and Accident Prevention Bureau v. Commissioner of
Insurance, - Mass. -, 424 N.E.2d 1127 (1981); Massachusetts Automobile Rating and Accident
Prevention Bureau v. Commissioner of Ins., - Mass. -, 411 N.E.2d 762 (1980); Attorney Gen. v.
Commissioner of Ins., 370 Mass. 791, 353 N.E.2d 745 (1976); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 358 Mass. 272, 263 N.E.2d 698 (1970); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Commissioner of
Ins., 358 Mass. 357, 265 N.E.2d 90 (1970).
The court in ,4eina Casualty & Surety Co. struck a balancing position. It held that
"[w]hile it is not constitutionally required to fix rates which will guarantee a profit to all
insurers, [the State] may not constitutionally fix rates which are so low that if the insurers
engage in business they may do so only at a loss. The insurers are not required to either
submit to confiscatory rates or go out of business. They have a right to rates which are
not confiscatory. . . and to judicial review on the constitutional or statutory adequacy of
such rates."
Id at 281, 263 N.E.2d at 703.
94. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73, 81 (E.D.N.C. 1965), a 'd, 361 F.2d 870 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966).
95. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 192 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1966).
96. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bentley, 122 Ga. App. 738, 178 S.E.2d 700 (1970).
97. 329 Mass. 265, 107 N.E.2d 807 (1952).

NORTH CAROLINA L 14W REVIEW[

[Vol. 61

highest rate that is not excessive." 98
In New York's first judicial review of some of the standards, National
Bureau of Casualty Underwriters v. Superintendent,9 9 the Appellate Division
noted that the standards lacked "an exact statutory formula for rate-making"
and that the regulator "is not restricted to a rigid formula of his own or another's devising nor. . . is he bound to hold rules of past practice immutable."' 10 0 The New York statute primarily prescribed that rates be "reasonable
and adequate." 10' The Pennsylvania statute interpreted in PennsylvaniaInsurance Department v. City of Philadelphia10 2 provided for consideration of underwriting profit and contingencies. 10 3 The Pennsylvania court affirmed
allowance of six percent of proposed premiums for underwriting profit and
contingencies, finding that the "figure is one which has customarily been used
in Pennsylvania insurance rate-making, and is the amount recommended by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners."'' 10 The court rejected
an argument that underwriting profit must be calculated by a percentage of
invested capital and not by a percentage of premiums, stating that the Kansas
Aetna case, which applied a return-on-capital approach to insurance ratemaking, had been "generally rejected."' 05
The court in City ofPhiladelphiqnoted reasons for distinguishing between
utility and insurance rate-making and distinguished the Kansas Aetna case
and two other cases supporting the view that income from the investment of
unearned premiums could be included in underwriting profit. 10 6 Nevertheless, statutory construction controlled its decision. The court concluded that
"it is clear that the legislature did not intend such income to be included in the
determination of 'underwriting profit.' "107 Noting that the model bill on
which the Pennsylvania statute was based "contained only the word 'profit'
with a footnote to the effect that the insurance industry recommended the inclusion of the word 'underwriting,"' the court found legislative adoption of
"underwriting profit" as "specifically limiting the meaning of the word
profit."' 0 8 The court relied on Bullion for the "accepted meaning" of underwriting profit, and distinguished its statutory prescription for "underwriting
profit" from the Kansas Aetna's "reasonable" rate. 109 It also distinguished an
early Virginia case involving a statute that referred only to "reasonable"
98. Id at 270, 107 N.E.2d at 811.
99. 6 A.D.2d 73, 174 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1958), rev'd as moot, 6 N.Y.2d 842, 160 N.E.2d 84, 188
N.Y.S.2d 549 (1959).

100. Id at 77-78, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
101. Id at 76, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 839. A reasonable profit, however, was a factor to be consid-

ered in setting a reasonable rate.
102. 196 Pa. Super. 221, 173 A.2d 811 (1961).

103. Id at 248, 173 A.2d at 824.
104. Id
105. Id at 249, 173 A.2d at 824-25.
106. Id at 250-51, 173 A.2d at 825-26. The three cases are discussed infra text accompanying

notes 109-11.
107. Id at 249-50, 173 A.2d at 825.
108. Id at 250, 173 A.2d at 825.
109. Id
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profit' 0 and the early Missouri decision in Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde. i '
Those cases indicated to the court "that the legislature, by adding the word
'1 12
'underwriting,' intended to exclude consideration of investment income."
1 13
the first of
In American Druggists' Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth,

three Virginia cases dealing with underwriting profit, the Virginia Supreme
Court approved a rate set by the regulatory commission that was based on a
formula which included a five percent underwriting profit allowance.1 4 The
court found that a definite rate-making pattern had long been approved and
used in Virginia 1 5 and noted that a report made after Virginia's 1928 regulatory act was affirmed "in all respects" in the earlier Virginia case distinguished
in City of Philadelphia." 6 The court in American Druggists' noted that the
report had produced a formula for establishing rates which included a five
percent provision for underwriting profit and contingencies; it appeared "that
this formula is the yardstick which the Commission has used since 1928 to
determine whether fire insurance rates are excessive, inadequate or unfairly
discriminatory."11 7 InffartfordMutuallnsuranceCo. v. Commonwealth1 8 the
supreme court held that the commission properly disregarded a company's
income from investment of unearned premiums and required application of
the commission's formula with a percentage factor for profit even though the
applicant was a mutual company.' 9 The court noted that the approved
formula in Virginia for thirty years had included the five percent factor for
underwriting profit and contingencies.120 Later, in Virginia State AFL-CIO v.
Commonwealth, 12 1 the court did not discuss the meaning of the standard but
held that the commission should consider income from investment of loss
reserves as well as from investment of unearned premium reserves as a relevant factor in fixing a reasonable margin for underwriting profit and contingencies.' 22 The commission had considered income from investment of
unearned premium reserves and had reduced the margin for underwriting
profit and contingencies from 5 percent to 4.5 percent to compensate for that
110. Id (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 160 Va. 698, 169 S.E. 859 (1933)). See infra

notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
111.
S.W. 65
112.
113.
114.
115.

196 Pa. Super. at 251, 173 A.2d at 826 (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 315 Mo. 113, 285
(1926), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 440 (1928)).
Id at 251, 173 A.2d at 826.
201 Va. 275, 110 S.E.2d 509 (1959).
Id at 277, 110 S.E.2d at 510.
Id at 278, 110 S.E.2d at 511 (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Virginia, 160 Va. 698, 169 S.E. 859

(1933)).
116. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text. After Virginia enacted its 1928 regula-

tory act, the regulatory authority issued the 1928 Virginia Corporation Commission Report that
was cited in both Virginia cases.
117. 201 Va. at 279, 110 S.E.2d at 511.
118. 201 Va. 491, 112 S.E.2d 142 (1960).
119. Id at 495-96, 112 S.E.2d at 146. The court noted, however, that the income from invest-

ment of unearned premiums was so small as not to change the result.
120. Id at 496, 112 S.E.2d at 146.
121. 209 Va. 776, 167 S.E.2d 322 (1969).

122. Id at 785, 167 S.E.2d at 329.
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income. 123 In remanding the case for consideration of income on the loss
reserves as well, the court noted that the commission, not actuaries or other

experts, "is charged with the responsibility of fixing a 'reasonable margin for
underwriting profit and contingencies.' " 2 4
In that same year, 1969, in In re Insurance Rating Board,125 the New

Jersey Supreme Court held that earnings from reserves for unearned premiums and for losses were relevant to a court's decision whether to approve in-

creased rates.12 6 The court remanded for further proceedings to develop the
additional information necessary to determine "the amount an insurer should
receive as a reasonable profit."' 127 The parties had used five percent of premiums for underwriting profit and contingencies, and the court "wanted to know
the origin of the five percent figure and its justification."'' 28
Of course, other cases were decided during the three decades separating

South-Eastern Underwriters and the North Carolina "Hornbook."' 129 The
cases discussed above, however, are the principal cases from jurisdictions

other than North Carolina that applied the model bill standards in decisions
before Commissioner Ingram's incumbency. Although the standards were
nearly universal, they left much room for companies, commissioners, and consumers to contest regulated rates. The only confines were the courts' concepts
of reasonableness.
III.

A.

THE NORTH CAROLINA "BATTLEGROUND"

Setting The Stage ForBattle

Variations of the model bill standards were long applied in North Carolina under separate statutes for bureau-proposed rates, subject to the Commissioner's prior approval, for fire and homeowners, 130 workers'
compensation, 13 and automobile liability insurance rates. 132 Other statutes
123. id at 781, 167 S.E.2d at 326.
124. Id at 785-86 n.13, 167 S.E.2d at 329 n.13.
125. 55 N.J. 19, 258 A.2d 892 (1969).
126. Id at 22-23, 258 A.2d at 893-94.
127. Id at 21, 258 A.2d at 893.
128. Id
129. E.g., Carroll v. Barnes, 169 Colo. 277,455 P.2d 644 (1969); Hardward Mut. Casualty Co.
v. Premo, 153 Conn. 465, 217 A.2d 698 (1966); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 192
So. 2d 312 (Fla. App. 1966); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bentley, 122 Ga. App. 738, 178 S.E.2d 700 (1970);
Thurman v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. 1961); Maryland Fire Underwriters
Rating Bureau v. Commissioner, 260 Md. 258, 272 A.2d 24 (1971); Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner, 359 Mass. 111, 268 N.E.2d 144 (1971); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Commissioner, 358
Mass. 387, 265 N.E.2d 90 (1970); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Commissioner, 358 Mass. 272, 263
N.E.2d 698 (1970); Insurance Rating Bd. v. Commissioner, 356 Mass. 184, 248 N.E.2d 500 (1969);
In re Application of Ins. Rating Bd., 63 N.J. 413,307 A.2d 604 (1973); Oklahoma State AFL-CIO
v. State Bd. for Property & Casualty Rates, 463 P.2d 693 (Okla. 1970). For a comprehensive
commentary on earlier cases, see McCullough I, supra note 4; McCullough II, Supra note 4.
130. Law of March 6, 1945, ch. 380, § 1, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 443, 443-49, repealedby Law of
June 30, 1977, ch. 828, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1119. See infra note 135.
131. Law of March 6, 1945, ch. 381, § 1, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 457, repealedby Law of June
30, 1977, ch. 828, § 8, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1119, 1133. See infra note 135.
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governed other lines, 133 and rates for some lines were not subject to commissioner approval or disapproval. 134 The statutes were sometimes studied 13 5

and amended, 136 but were seldom the subject of judicial review. 137 Prior to
1969, only two North Carolina Supreme Court opinions dealt directly with

insurance rate regulation. 138 Neither questioned the sufficiency of the stan132. Law of March 6, 1945, ch. 381, § 2, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 457, 459, repealedby Law of
June 30, 1977, ch. 828, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1119. See infra note 135.
133. Law of March 6, 1945, ch. 380, § 1, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 443, 454, repealedby Law of
June 30, 1977, ch. 828, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1119.
134. See State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. Integon Life Ins. Co., 28 N.C. App. 7, 220 S.E.2d 409
(1975), and infra text accompanying notes 372-75.
135. Early statutes were supplemented by an expanded statutory scheme enacted in 1945, see
supra notes 130-33, after a study by a Commission consisting of 15 persons and chaired by Robert
H. Wettach, then Dean of the School of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. See
REPORT OF THE N.C. COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE INS. LAWS (1945). See also Wettach, The
1945 Revision ofthe Insurance Laws of North Carolina,23 N.C.L. REV. 283 (1945). Under the

1945 statutory scheme, the types of insurance subject to rate regulation had been divided into five
categories, each of which was regulated in a slightly different manner-fire, casualty, miscellaneous lines, automobile liability and workers' compensation. See Law of March 6, 1945, ch. 380,
1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 443 (formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-125 to -131.9
(1975) (fire insurance); Id §§ 58-131.10 to .25 (casualty insurance); Id §§ 58-131.26 to .33 (miscellaneous insurance)) (repealed 1977); Law of April 4, 1939, ch. 394, 1935 N.C. Pub. Laws 861
(formerly codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-246 to -248.10 (1975) (automobile liability insurance)) (repealed 1977); Law of April 15, 1931, ch. 279, 1931 N.C. Pub. Laws 355 (formerly
codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-102 to -104.6 (1972) (workers' compensation insurance)) (repealed 1977). A study between 1945 and 1977 dealt with automobile liability insurance.
See GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMM'N ON AUTO. LiAB. INS. & RATES, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR OF
NORTH CAROLINA (1971). The 1977 Rating Law, Act of June 30, 1977, ch. 828, 1977 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1119 which repealed those 1945 provisions, resulted from another study extending to all
lines of insurance. See J. HALL, INSURANCE RATE REGULATIONS AND THE AUTOMOBILE REINSURANCE FACILITY-A REPORT TO THE JOINT SENATE/HOUSE COMMITTEE, NORTH CAROLINA

GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1977). See generally, Survey ofDevelopments in North CarolinaLaw, 1977Insurance, 56 N.C.L. REV. 843, 1088-92 (1978). The 1977 General Assembly also instructed the
Legislative Research Commission to study the State's insurance laws. See Law of July 1, 1977, ch.
1028, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 1336. For a study outside of North Carolina, see, e.g., B. SCHENCK,
CARTELS VS. COMPETITION: A CRITIQUE OF INSURANCE PRICE REGULATION, A REPORT OF THE
NEw YORK SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE TO THE NEW YORK GOVERNOR AND THE NEw

YORK STATE LEGISLATURE (1975). See generally Ippolito, The Effects of Price Regulation in the
Automobile Insurance Industry, 22 J. LAW & ECON. 55 (1979).
136. See, eg., Law of July 21, 1971, ch. 1115, § 4, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1666, amending Law
of March 6, 1945, ch. 381, § 2, 1945 N.C. Sess. Laws 457, 459 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58248.1 (1975)) (repealed 1977).
137. Appeals from the Commissioner's orders regarding rates are to the North Carolina Court
of Appeals. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-9.4 (1975). Prior to enactment of that provision in 1971, appeals from two orders denying automobile liability insurance rate increases were appealed to the
Wake County Superior Court, which ruled against the Commissioner in both cases. See also infra
notes 138 & 418.
138. In re Blue Bird Taxi Co., 237 N.C. 373, 75 S.E.2d 156 (1953), limited the statutory authority of the automobile insurance rating bureau to promulgate an experience rating plan to the
express provisions of the statute involved. In re Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 245 N.C. 44, 96 S.E.2d
344 (1957), upheld the Commissioner's denial of a proposed fire insurance classification plan that
differentiated between farm and non-farm dwellings on the basis of hazard alone. The office and
powers of the Commissioner were discussed in State exrel Comm'r of Ins. v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486,
164 S.E.2d 151 (1968). Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 270 N.C. 454, 155 S.E.2d 118
(1967), upheld the automobile insurance assigned risk plan and added dictum regarding confiscatory rates. Earlier insurance regulatory cases dealt with unsuccessful statutory attempts to create a
pension fund for firemen by requiring insurance companies to add a tax, calculated at a percentage of the premiums, to the premiums for fire and lightning insurance. See, e.g., Great Amer. Ins.
Co. v. Johnson, 257 N.C. 367, 126 S.E.2d 92 (1962); Great Amer. Ins. Co. v. Gold, 254 N.C. 168,
118 S.E.2d 792 (1961); In re North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 249 N.C. 466, 106 S.E.2d 879
(1959); American Equitable Assurance Co. v. Gold, 249 N.C. 461, 106 S.E.2d 875 (1959); Bizzell v.
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dards or addressed appropriate rate-making methodology. In 1969, the North
Carolina Supreme Court commented upon the standards in the first of its two
rate-case decisions preceding the incumbency of Commissioner Ingram.
139
The 1969 case, In re North Carolina Fire Insurance Rating Bureau, involved the statutory standard that fire insurance rates "will produce a fair and
reasonable profit."'140 Although the sufficiency of the standard was not under
attack, some statements by the court concerning the standard became seeds for
subsequent controversy and fruit for precedent. The court held that the determination of a "fair and reasonable profit" is a question of fact for the
Commissioner:
The ultimate question to be determined by the Commissioner is
whether an increase in premium rates is necessary in order to yield a
"fair and reasonable profit". . . . This cannot be determined without specific findings of fact, upon substantial evidence, as to (1) the
reasonably anticipated loss experience during the life of the policies
to be issued in the near future, (2) the reasonably anticipated operating expenses in the same period, and (3) the percent of Earned Prewill constitute a "fair and reasonable profit" in that
miums which
41
period.'
In re North CarolinaAutomobile Rate Office, 142 a 1971 case, included a
discussion titled "Absence of Legislative Standards."' 143 After reciting the
statutory standards that automobile liability insurance rates be "reasonable,
adequate, not unfairly discriminatory, and in the public interest," 144 Chief
Justice Bobbitt noted that the statute gave the Commissioner no guidance for
the determination of reasonableness. "In the absence of a legislative formula
or standards, the Commissioner has had no alternative but to look to the ratemaking procedures recognized in the industry and in other States." 45 Thus,
the rate bureau and the Commissioner adopted the industry view that the reasonableness of a profit was determined by a margin for underwriting profit.
The court observed that a five percent margin had been "generally approved
in the industry."'146
In dissent, Justice Lake, who had authored the court's 1969 FireInsurance
Rating Bureau opinion, stated his view that the standards were sufficient. By
analogy to public utility rate-making, he interpreted the standards to mean
that rates should be sufficient to pay losses and expenses and to provide "a
margin of profit sufficient to attract investors to the insurance business in comGreat Am. Ins. Co., 248 N.C. 294, 103 S.E.2d 348 (1958); American Equitable Assurance Co. v.
Gold, 248 N.C. 288, 103 S.E.2d 344 (1958).
139. 275 N.C. 15, 165 S.E.2d 207 (1969).
140. Id at 30, 165 S.E.2d at 217 (applying former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-131.2). See stpra
note 130.
141. 275 N.C. at 39-40, 165 S.E.2d at 224.
142. 278 N.C. 302, 180 S.E.2d 155 (1971).
143. Id at 313, 180 S.E.2d at 163.
144. Id at 314, 180 S.E.2d at 163 (citing former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.1).
145. Id at 314, 180 S.E.2d at 164.
146. Id at 315, 180 S.E.2d at 164.
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parison with other businesses of like risk."' 147 An underwriting profit margin
"can still be determined by the test of what is necessary to attract investors to
148
this business."
The two opinions illustrate that it is far easier to recite the "reasonable"
standard than "it is to put the statement into practice by formulating such a
rate." 149 In formulating proposed rates, the supreme court in the 1969 case
held that competent evidence of cost trends, including expert testimony, must
be considered. Although the court held that the Commissioner must consider
trend evidence, it stated that the Commissioner may determine the credibility
and weight of such evidence.15 0 In the 1971 decision, despite the majority's
evidentiary misgivings,15 1 the court affirmed the Commissioner's admission
into evidence and consideration of statistical data projecting increased costs
and his approval of a future rate increase.' 52 Undeterred by admissibility of
the statistical data, the dissent found the approved rate increase premised
"upon a mere administrative declaration that the old rates are 'inadequate'
and the new ones are 'reasonable.' "153 Prophetically, the dissent discerned
that on the same basis the Commissioner could also order a decrease in the
15 4
rates.
Both the 1969 and 1971 cases subsequently were cited as fully setting
forth the statutory frameworks and procedures governing regulation of those
lines' rates applicable at those times. 155 The court in both cases recognized
that rate regulation is an exercise of the state legislative power. "[T]he only
power the Commissioner has to fix rates is such power as the General Assembly has delegated to and vested in him."' 156 Nevertheless, both deferred to
some degree to the Commissioner's judgment: "[T]he Commissioner of Insurance 'is a specialist in the field,' "157 and, "in making what must be considered
in large measure a policy or judgment decision, the Commissioner [has] the
benefit of his own continuous study and knowledge of changing
15 8
conditions."'
147. Id at 331, 180 S.E.2d at 174 (Lake, J., dissenting).
148. Id at 331, 180 S.E.2d at 175.
149. In re North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 2 N.C. App. 10, 15, 162 S.E.2d 671, 673
(1968), modbfed and af'd, 275 N.C. 15, 165 S.E. 2d 207 (1969).
150. 275 N.C. at 36, 165 S.E.2d at 2.22.

151. 278 N.C. at 320, 180 S.E.2d at 167. The majority found that much of the documentary
evidence summarizing statistical data obtained from insurance companies and other sources
would not be admissible under the rules of evidence applicable in a trial court and that some data
regarding expenses were insufficient. Nevertheless, the court found the uncontradicted evidence
sufficient to support the Commissioner's allowance of a 2.8% rate increase. Id at 321, 180 S.E.2d
at 167-68. The dissent found that the statistical data were clearly admissible even in a trial court
under the exception to the hearsay rule for entries made in the regular course of business. Id at
332, 180 S.E.2d at 175 (Lake, J., dissenting).
152. Id at 320-21, 180 S.E.2d at 167-68.
153. Id at 322-23, 180 S.E.2d at 169 (Lake, J., dissenting).
154. Id at 334, 180 S.E.2d at 176 (Lake, J., dissenting).
155. State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. State ex re. Attorney Gen., 18 N.C. App. 23, 26, 195
S.E.2d 572, 574 (1973).
156. 278 N.C. at 314, 180 S.E.2d at 164.
157. 275 N.C. at 35, 165 S.E.2d at 221.
158. 278 N.C. at 320, 180 S.E.2d at 167.
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In 1971 and 1972 the Commissioner approved increases for automobile
liability,'5 9 automobile physical damage,160 and workers' compensation insurance rates. 16 1 The increases had been proposed in separate filings by the three
rating bureaus then in existence. Separate statutory standards applied, including some 1971 amendments making the automobile liability standards more
specific and providing for consideration of investment income from unearned
premium and loss reserves.' 62 The state attorney general intervened in the
three cases and appealed all three to the court of appeals. The attorney general argued for a return-on-capital approach, relying primarily on the Kansas
Aetna case and Justice Lake's dissent in In re Automobile Rate Office. 16 3 The
court of appeals rejected that argument, interpreting each of the statutory standards as providing for the underwriting profit approach. 64 The court held,
however, that the supreme court's opinion in Fire Insurance Rating Bureau
required the Commissioner to make specific findings of fact, including the per65
cent of earned premiums that will constitute a "fair and reasonable profit."'1
In one case the court added that "a finding without more that the figure of 5%
has been generally accepted in North Carolina and throughout the United
States for some 20 years would not be sufficient for concluding that 5% is 'fair
and reasonable' at this time."' 166 Absent a statutory directive to consider investment income, the court clearly concluded that the phrase "fair and reason167
able" refers to underwriting profit and does not include investment income.
As 1973 began, the court of appeals was confident that the major "insur16 8 Of
ance rate making procedures in this State [had] been fully discussed."'
course, the two supreme court opinions 169 and the three court of appeals
cases 170 established precedent on many points under those procedures, but
many undecided issues roamed within the realm of reasonableness. The ruler
of the realm until 1972, regarded by the court of appeals as an "able and
conscientious Commissioner,"' 7'1 was replaced on January 5, 1973, by Com159. State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. State ex rel. Attorney Gen., 18 N.C. App. 23, 195 S.E.2d

572 (1973).
160. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. State ex rel. Attorney Gen., 16 N.C. App. 724, 193 S.E.2d
432 (1972).
161.

State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. State ex rel. Attorney Gen., 19 N.C. App. 263, 198 S.E.2d

575 (1973).
162. See supra notes 130-33 and Law of July 21, 1971, ch. 1115, § 3, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws
1666.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45 & 147-54.

164. 18 N.C. App. at 27, 195 S.E.2d at 574; 16 N.C. App. at 729, 193 S.E.2d at 435; 19 N.C.
App. at 271, 198 S.E.2d at 581.
165. See supra text accompanying note 141.
166. 16 N.C. App. at 728, 193 S.E.2d at 435.
167. Id at 729, 193 S.E.2d at 435. See also State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. State ex rel. Attorney Gen., 19 N.C. App. 263, 271, 198 S.E.2d 575, 581 (1973).
168. 18 N.C. App. at 26, 195 S.E.2d at 574.
169. See supra notes 139 & 142.
170. See supra notes 159-61.
171. State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. State ex rel Attorney Gen., 16 N.C. App. 279, 286, 192

S.E.2d 138, 144 (1972).
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missioner Ingram.'

B. The Early Battles Over Motor Vehicle ClassfcationPlans

In the first appellate case involving Commissioner Ingram, the Merit Classification Case, 173 hearings had been held by his predecessor regarding proposed changes in private passenger automobile liability insurance
classifications. The basic rate-making process requires rate classification
plans, which "serve to assure that risks with similar characteristics receive
comparable price treatment."' 74 Statutory amendments had mandated a particular rate classification plan and a safe-driver plan. 175 The hearings had
been recessed and no order had been filed. 176 After holding office a few
months, Commissioner Ingram held a brief hearing and soon thereafter issued
orders.' 77 One order abolished all existing classification plans for automobile
liability insurance and the existing safe-driver plan, promulgating instead
Commissioner Ingram's new "merit classification plan" under which all insureds would pay the same base rate but would be subject to surcharges for
certain criminal motor vehicle violations. 178 The court of appeals reversed
and vacated that order as unsupported by substantial evidence. No evidence
had been received by the Commissioner regarding the new classification plan.
"The plan was not placed in the record during any of the proceedings before
the Commissioner. The plan was first seen as an exhibit attached to [the order
promulgating it.]"' 179 Nor was the plan based on appropriate findings of fact.
"Administrative declarations, however sound and noble their purpose may be,
are not findings of fact."' 80
Soon after his "merit classification plan" was vacated, Commissioner Ingram gave notice of and held hearings on classifications "based on the male
sex and age of operators or owners of the automobiles insured" or, simply
stated, young male drivers.' 8 ' His resulting order that "no premium rate for
private passenger automobile liability insurance. . . shall be based in whole
or in part on the age and sex of a person insured thereunder"' 1 2 was reversed
172. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 19 N.C. App.
548, 550, 199 S.E.2d 479, 481, cert. denied, 284 N.C. 424, 200 S.E.2d 663 (1973).
173. Id
174. NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, 1969 PROCEEDINGS, VOL. II, at 547, once introduced

as evidence by Commissioner Ingram in an appellate case. See Record on Appeal, State ex rel.
Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 19 N.C. App. 548, 199 S.E.2d
479, ceri. denied, 284 N.C. 424, 200 S.E.2d 663 (1973), p.73 & Exhibit 14.
175. Law of July 21, 1971, ch. 1205 § 5, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1766, 1773-74 (codified at N.C.
GEN. Stat. § 58-248.8 (1975)) (repealed 1977).
176. 19 N.C. App. at 550-51, 199 S.E.2d at 481.
177. Id
178. Id at 549, 199 S.E.2d at 480.
179. Id at 551-52, 199 S.E.2d at 482.
180. Id at 552, 199 S.E.2d at 482.
181. State ex rel Conm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 23 N.C. App.
475, 475, 209 S.E.2d 411, 412 (1974), cert. denied, 286 N.C. 412, 211 S.E.2d 219 (1975).
182. Id at 476, 209 S.E.2d at 412.
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in the FirstAgeandSex Case.'8 3 A statute had prescribed a particular plan 84
under which Commissioner Ingram conceded "the age and sex of insured
drivers are essential classification criteria." 18 5 The court held that "by ordering the establishment of a premium rate classification plan not based in whole
has exceeded the
or in part on the age and sex of drivers, the Commissioner
186
authority delegated to him by the Legislature."'
The court of appeals in the FirstMotorcycle Case,187 applying the same
statutes as the FirstAge and Sex Case, vacated Commissioner Ingram's order
eliminating the existing classification plan and held that he exceeded his statutory authority in replacing it with "a one-class plan for all motorcycle operators." 88 The vacated order contained no finding that all motorcycle drivers,
regardless of age or sex and regardless of the type of motorcycle, "constitute a
reasonably homogenous group sharing essentially the same hazard for liability
insurance purposes."' 8 9

Those 1973 and 1974 court of appeals cases, which the supreme court
declined to review, 190 chronicled Commissioner Ingram's early classification
case losses on the "battleground." Following his vow to "win the war,"' 19 1
however, he persisted. Having failed in court, he prevailed in the General
Assembly, which in 1975 enacted classification provisions' 92 for which he proclaimed pride in draftmanship. 193 The court referred to the 1975 statutes as
"House Bill 28."' 194 Those provisions and Commissioner Ingram's orders
under them first reached the supreme court in House Bill 28 Motorcycle195 and
House Bill 28 Automobile. 196 The new provisions "in essence... sought to
prohibit the use of age or sex as criteria" for automobile classifications and to
insure that a larger proportion of premiums reflected "poor driving records"
197
or "inexperienced drivers."'

House Bill 28 Automobile, decided in late 1977, marked two turning
points. First, it narrowed the supreme court's earlier holdings, including the
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id at 475, 209 S.E.2d at 411.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.9 (1971) (repealed 1975).
23 N.C. App. at 478, 209 S.E.2d at 413.
Id

187. State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 24 N.C. App,
223, 210 S.E.2d 441 (1974), cert. denied, 286 N.C. 412, 211 S.E.2d 801 (1975).
188. Id at 228, 210 S.E.2d at 444.

189. Id at 227, 210 S.E.2d at 443.
190. See supra notes 172, 181 & 187.

191. See supra text accompanying note 20.
192. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-30.3 to -30.4 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
193. Record at 14, State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office,
294 N.C. 60, 241 S.E.2d 324 (1978).
194. State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 293 N.C. 365,

368, 239 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1977).
195. State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 294 N.C. 60,
411 S.E.2d 324 (1978).
196. State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 293 N.C. 365,
239 S.E.2d 48 (1977).
197. Id
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Energy Crisis198 and 1974Automobile Liabili y Filing1 99 cases discussed below,
which interpreted the scope of the Commissioner's authority under the earlier
statutes.2 °0 Of the supreme court's five earlier holdings concerning orders of
Commissioner Ingram, four had reversed his orders. 20 1 Second, it focused on
"the new proceedings" that had begun under the 1977 Rating Law and had
arguably rendered moot the proceeding in House Bill 28 Automobile.20 2 The
earlier statutes had been either repealed or substantially amended by the 1977
Rating Law,20 3 and a new classification plan had been filed by the new rate
bureau. 2°4 Indeed, as the court noted in a footnote, after the court's opinion
was prepared but before it was filed, the Commissioner had approved the 1977
classification filing.20 5 The new statutory scheme was a significant turning
point in North Carolina. 20 6 The 1977 scheme substantially amended the automobile classifications of House Bill 28 but continued its age and sex prohibitions,20 7 perhaps prophesying Commissioner Ingram's approval of the 1977
filing. Apart from any significance of the age and sex prohibitions, House Bill
28.4utomobile presents a precedential analysis of the insurance, rate problems
confronting the courts.
Its relatively simple holding vacated Commissioner Ingram's orders as
exceeding his statutory authority by being "contrary to the provisions of
House Bill 28" and lacking the "requisite specific findings of fact."20 8 The
court described the then-existing liability insurance classifications and subclassification for a safe-driver plan, the mandates of House Bill 28, the plan proposed by the rating bureau, the plan proposed by Commissioner Ingram's
staff, and the plan, "essentially his staffs," adopted by Commissioner Ingram.20 9 The physical damage coverage plans presented a novel and perplexing situation, but the court described the existing and proposed plans,
198. State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 287 N.C. 192,
214 S.E.2d 98 (1975). See infra text accompanying notes 235-47.

199. State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 292 N.C. 1, 231
S.E.2d 867 (1977). See infra text accompanying notes 248-62.

200. See infra text accompanying notes 235-62.
201. State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Admin. Office, 292 N.C. 1, 231
S.E.2d 867 (1977) (the 1974 4utomobile Filing case); State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 70, 231 S.E.2d 882 (1977) (1974 automobile physical damage "deemer" clause); State exrel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 291
N.C. 55, 229 S.E.2d 268 (1976) (homeowner's insurance "deemer" clause); State ex rel Comm'r of
Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 287 N.C. 192, 214 S.E.2d 98 (1975) (the Energy

Crisis case). Commissioner Ingram's order approving a rate bureau filing was upheld in Foremost
Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 292 N.C. 244, 232 S.E.2d 414 (1977), discussed infra text accompanying notes
362-66. In a sixth case decided before House Bill 28.4utomobile, the supreme court held a statute
unconstitutional and did not determine the validity of the Commissioner's. orders. See Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Ingram, 290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498 (1976), discussed infra text

accompanying notes 380-406.
202. 293 N.C. at 394, 239 S.E.2d at 66.
203. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-30.4 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
204. 293 N.C. at 394 n.35, 239 S.E.2d at 50.

205. Id at 394 n.35, 239 S.E.2d at 66 n.35.
206. See infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.

207. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-30.4 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
208. 293 N.C. at 393, 239 S.E.2d at 65.
209. Id at 375, 239 S.E.2d at 55.
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including the plan adopted by Commissioner Ingram. 2 10 The adopted plans
involved surcharges based, not on insurance statistics, but on drivers' license
statistics maintained by the state department of motor vehicles. 2 11 The orders
adopting the plans recited Commissioner Ingram's finding that the rating bureau plans were "unreasonable" and that the adopted plans met the statutory
standards of being "reasonable, adequate, not unfairly discriminatory. '2 12
In attacking the orders, the rating bureau and companies followed a
formula that had been used to challenge earlier orders in the Energy Crisis and
1974.4utomobileLiabiliy Filing cases. They argued that the orders exceeded
statutory authority, did not contain adequate findings of fact, and were not
supported by substantial evidence. 2 13 On the statutory authority issue, the
court carefully applied its earlier cases under the old rating laws and found
that Commissioner Ingram had not exceeded his statutory authority because
"the orders constitute an [authorized] approval in part" of the rating bureau
proposal. 214 The court concluded, however, that Commissioner Ingram had
"exceeded his authority under House Bill 28 by establishing five instead of
four primary classes in his collision order. '215 The sufficiency of the findings
issue was "left hopelessly confused," and because of "the evidentiary conflict
compounded by the ambiguity" in the orders, the court held that "there are
certain fundamental factual issues which need to be. . . resolved by the Com2 16
missioner as a prerequisite for any kind of meaningful judicial review."
The issues to be resolved included "ultimate factual findings" following the
1969 formulation of In re North CarolinaFireInsuranceRating Bureau. The
court stated that "simply" finding that the plans fit the familiar statutory standards, "standing alone, is insufficient." 2 17 Regarding the evidence supporting
the Commissioner's order, the court found "nothing sacrosanct about so-called
'insurance statistics,' " and held that evidence of motor vehicle license statistics
218
was acceptable.
House Bill 28 Motorcycle, decided in early 1978, vacated Commissioner
Ingram's 1975 order in which "he in effect abolished all primary [motorcycle]
classifications on the basis of use and all safe driver type subclassifications,
both prescribed in [House Bill 28.]"219 The order established only two premiums: "one premium for small motorcycles and another for large
motorcycles." 220 The rating bureau contended that House Bill 28, although
abolishing classifications based on age or sex, continued use classifications and
a safe-driver subclassification plan and covered motorcycles as well as
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

375-78, 239 S.E.2d at 55-56.
372-77, 239 S.E.2d at 54-56.
378-79, 239 S.E.2d at 57.
385-91, 239 S.E.2d at 61-64.
388, 239 S.E.2d at 62.
391, 239 S.E.2d at 64-65.
390, 239 S.E.2d at 64.

217. Id at 391, 239 S.E.2d at 64.
218. Id at 384, 239 S.E.2d at 60.
219. 294 N.C. at 64, 241 S.E.2d at 327.
220. Id
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automobiles. 221 Stating that interpretation of House Bill 28 was "the principal
and dispositive legal question, ' 222 the court found the bill's "primary purpose
.. . was obviously to abolish age and sex as criteria for classifying motor vehicle-both automobile and motorcycle-insurance. '2 23 The court analyzed the
bill's legislative history, including substantial amendment by the 1977 Rating
Law22 4 and found that it "mandated" and "continues to mandate. . . not just
any plan abolishing age and sex classification criteria but a plan which complied with the revised classifications as set out in the statute." 225 The court
found that Commissioner Ingram "both in this case and in [House Bill 28 Auto promulgate a plan which complied with those revised
tomobile] failed
'' 6
classifications. 2
Because new rates had gone into effect pursuant to the 1977 Rating Law,
the court decided that a remand in either House Bill 28 Motorcycle or House
Bill 28 Automobile "would be futile. ' 227 The orders were vacated because

"rates are made prospectively, not retroactively." 228 Nevertheless, the court
observed that if evidence establishes that existing rates are excessive, the
"Commissioner has the power under present provisions. . . upon proper proceedings, to reduce these rates." 229 The classification cases appropriately
ended on this note about rate reductions.
C. The Annual Battles Over Automobile Liability InsuranceRates
Commissioner Ingram's predecessor, partially approving a 1971 filing for
increased automobile liability insurance rates based upon the most current
available statistics, found as a fact "that the actual North Carolina underwriting experience data shows [sic] that the companies sustained an underwriting
loss on automobile liability insurance in North Carolina for the years 1967,
1968 and 1969."23 0 He approved an 8.9 percent increase, reduced by reason of

federal price control regulations to 7.4 percent. The increase would not have
by1
become effective until after an affirmance of the Commissioner's approval 23
the court of appeals in 1973, after Commissioner Ingram had taken office.
In connection with his "merit classification plan," Commissioner Ingram ordered that the increase not be effected until the plan and new rates thereunder
were implemented.2 32 In an additional holding, the court of appeals in the
221. Id at 63, 241 S.E.2d at 326.
222. Id at 64, 241 S.E.2d at 327.

223. Id
224. Id at 68-69, 241 S.E.2d at 329-30.

225. Id at 70, 241 S.E.2d at 331.
226. Id at 70-71, 241 S.E.2d at 331.
227. Id at 70, 241 S.E.2d at 331.
228. Id at 71, 241 S.E.2d at 331.
229. Id at 72, 241 S.E.2d at 332.
230. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. State ex rel. Attorney Gen., 16 N.C. App. 279, 285, 192
S.E.2d 138, 143 (1972).
231. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. State ex rel. Attorney General, 18 N.C. App. 23, 24, 195
S.E.2d 572, 573 (1973).
232. 19 N.C. App. at 549, 199 S.E.2d at 480.
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Merit ClassicationCase vacated that order. "The present Commissioner...
was without authority to suspend or disapprove the rates which had been duly
approved and ordered into effect, in the absence of notice, hearing and ap233
propriate findings of fact, all as required by" the applicable rating law.
That decision
came in late 1973, during the Arab oil embargo and the energy
234
crisis.
The Energy CrisisCase235 concerned the first of the then-required annual
filings by the automobile liability insurance rating bureau with Commissioner
Ingram. The rating bureau's 1973 filing for its 183 member companies, based
upon their experience for two years, proposed an average increase of 9.9 percent, amended to reflect the effectiveness of the earlier proposal for an average
of 2.3 percent. 23 6 Commissioner Ingram, after indicating that the energy crisis
"could well result in a rate reduction," ordered reductions averaging 13.2 per-cent. 23 7 He relied upon testimony of an economist who had formulated "original ideas as to how to fit the effect of the energy crisis into the ratemaking
formula as it has been used in North Carolina since 1961. ' ' 238 The supreme
court vacated Commissioner Ingram's rate-reduction orders, holding them to
be in excess of his statutory authority and unsupported by substantial evidence.239 Relying on Inre North CarolinaAutomobile Rate Office and 41lstate
InsuranceCo. v. Lanier, the court found "the intent of the General Assembly
to vest the Rate Office with primary authority to fix, adjust and propose rates
'240
subject to the approval or disapproval of the Commissioner of Insurance.
The court held that the Commissioner did not have "blanket authority. . . to
consider immediate emergency situations such as the energy crisis and enter
interim rate orders based thereon." 24 1 The court added that before the Commissioner could order a revision under the statute, "he must first make a determination that the rates charged or filed are excessive, inadequate,
unreasonable, unfairly discriminatory, or otherwise not in the public inter24 3
est."'242 In doing so, he must consider the statutory statistical prescriptions.
Finding that "the gist of this controversy involves the selection of rate-making
techniques that will properly account for the effects of the energy crisis," the
court held that the statutory "authority and duty.., lies primarily in the Rate
Office." 244 The "original ideas" of "an expert statistician" admittedly "not an
expert in insurance rate making" were held not to support a conclusion that
233. Id at 553, 199 S.E.2d at 482.
234. See infra text accompanying notes 235-47.

235. State ex reL Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 287 N.C. 192,
214 S.E.2d
236. Id
237. Id
238. Id
239. Id
240. Id
241. Id
242. Id
243. Id
244. Id

98 (1975).
at 194, 214 S.E.2d at
at 198, 214 S.E.2d at
at 195, 214 S.E.2d at
at 205, 214 S.E.2d at
at 202, 214 S.E.2d at
at 203, 214 S.E.2d at

99.
102.
100.
106.
104.
105 (emphasis in original).

at 204, 214 S.E.2d at 106.
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the rating bureau "was not proceeding with due diligence in dealing with relevant factors spawned by the energy crisis." 24 5 Noting that "the insurance ratemaking process is an attempt to predict the future by relying in large measure
upon what has occurred in the past," and analogizing its earlier approval of
experience trending by "expert testimony" in Fire InsuranceRating Bureau,
the court held that, in the absence of appropriate expert testimony for trending, Commissioner Ingram's conclusions were not supported by substantial evidence. 246 In essence, "there was no expert testimony by anyone
knowledgeable in the field of insurance ratemaking to support either the use of
. . 'original ideas' for rate-making purposes" or purported trending using
"two months experience in the energy crisis as a foundation for both a rate
change and a change in rate-making procedures." 247
The next annual automobile filing was reviewed by the supreme court in
early 1977 in 1974 Automobile Liability Filing.2 43 Questions of statutory authority centered on the same statutes applied in the Energy Crisis Case, which
was distinguished in 1974 Automobile Liability Filing.2 49 By ordering a 23.8
percent reduction for one coverage for which a 13.3 percent increase had been
proposed, and without resorting to other statutory authority, the court found
that Commissioner Ingram exceeded his statutory authority. 250 The court upheld, however, the Commissioner's approval of a 2.5 percent increase for another coverage, for which a 22.5 percent increase had been proposed. By
granting the 2.5 percent increase, the Commissioner "approved in part the
filing" and thus "acted within his statutory authority if his findings and order
were supported by material and substantial evidence." 251 In answering that
question, the court carefully considered the evidence, which included testimony of an insurance expert called by Commissioner Ingram's staff that
formed the principal basis for the Commissioner's findings of fact.25 2 The
court found substantial evidence to support Commissioner Ingram's finding,
253
on the "ultimate question" under the FireInsuranceRatingBureau formula,
that the 5 percent allowance for underwriting profit and contingencies should
be reduced by the 2.3 percent of earned premium reflecting annual return
from investment of unearned premium and loss reserves, for a fair and reasonable underwriting profit of 2.7 percent of earned premium.2- 4 In its review of
a five percent supplementary reduction, the court concluded that certain "fast
track" data regarding the energy crisis"could be considered, but that the supporting testimony, described by the witness as "qualitative information which
245. Id at 204-05, 214 S.E.2d at 106.
246. Id at 205-06, 214 S.E.2d at 106-07.

247. Id at 206, 214 S.E.2d at 107.
248. State exrel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 292 N.C. 1,231
S.E.2d 867 (1977).

249. Id at 18, 231 S.E.2d at 876.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id
Id
Id
Id.
Id

at 12, 231 S.E.2d at 873.
at 24, 231 S.E.2d at 880.
at 16, 231 S.E.2d at 875. See sufpra text accompanying note 141.
at 15-16, 231 S.E.2d at 875-76.
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should be looked upon with great care," was not sufficient. 255 The court emphasized the lack of probative force in this evidence, and pointed to the witness' "questionable deductions" and "dubious conclusion." 25 6 Regarding an
argument that Commissioner Ingram used "a different methodology in trending past loss experience to a future date," the court analyzed the evidence and
applied the expert-witness rule of Fire InsuranceRating Bureau.2 57 "Procedures and methods for trending" need not "be frozen," and the court found
that the expert's testimony constituted substantial evidence. 258 In carefully
considering the evidence on trending and analyzing Commissioner Ingram's
conclusions, the court acknowledged his authority "to accept. . . the evidence
and testimony," bdt faulted the application. 259 For instance, the court found
that the adopted trend "failed to accomplish" the statutory purpose of establishing "on the basis of trends in past loss experience.., the losses to be
anticipated during the future period in which the proposed rates will be in
effect."' 260 Moreover, "by not applying trend factors to the unallocated loss
adjustment expenses, the Commissioner failed to provide for future inflationary increases in many expense items."'26 1 In reaching those holdings, the court
observed that "rate-making is a process which envisions a projection of past
experience into the future to provide for a reasonable profit and nothing more.
However, such a prognostication can hardly be expected to achieve exact
'262
precision.

. The Turning Point ofthe Battle-1980 Insurance Case I
The first automobile filing under the 1977 Rating Law led to the first
supreme court case actually applying the new statutory scheme. In 1980 Insurance Case 263 the court found that recent rate history, which included the
"typical case" of Commissioner Ingram's disapproval of a rate filing, led to "a
stalemate" under the "prior approval" statutory requirements. 264 In response,
the 1977 Rating Law effected three "major changes," as summarized by the
court: (1) change "from a 'prior approval' system to a 'file and use' system,"
consistent with "the general trend"; (2) division into "essential and nonessential lines," the former with mandatory bureau rates and the latter with either
voluntary bureau rates or individual company rates, but both under the same
"basic standard .

-rates

are not to be 'excessive, inadequate or unfairly

discriminatory' "; (3) recoupment of losses sustained by the Reinsurance Facility, the statutory scheme for dealing with highurisk insureds in automobile lia255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

(1980).

Id at 19, 231 S.E.2d at 877.
Id at 20, 231 S.E.2d at 877.
Id at 20-22, 231 S.E.2d at 878-79.
Id at 22, 231 S.E.2d at 880.
Id at 24, 231 S.E.2d at 880.
Id at 23, 231 S.E.2d at 879.
Id at 25, 231 S.E.2d at 880.
Id at 26, 231 S.E.2d at 881.
State exrel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 269 SE.2d 547

264. Id at 388-89, 269 S.E.2d at 555.
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bility insurance. 265
Commissioner Ingram had disapproved the 1977 filing for an overall in-

crease of 6 percent, "capped" by statute2 66 at that level although a 23.2 percent

increase was otherwise indicated. 267 The court found "multiple legal errors."'268 First, the court found error in the Commissioner's use of statutory

authority and procedure, arising in part from his requirement that the filing

data be audited. 2 69 In its second, third, and fourth groups of holdings, all

concerning the statutory standards for rates, the court rejected Commissioner
Ingram's conclusion that rates were "excessive" unless they reflected income

on invested capital,270 rejected his use of a capital asset pricing model in determining the margin of allowance for underwriting profit,27 1 and approved a ten
differential found by Commissioner Ingram to be
percent Facility-coverage 272
"unfairly discriminatory."

The 1980 Insurance Case I holdings are summa-

rized in the following four subsections.
1. Statutory Authority and Procedure
273
Predictably and consistent with precedent under the prior rating laws,
the court held that even under the 1977 fie-and-use plan the filing proponent
274
has "the burden of showing the reasonableness of the proposed increase."

It agreed that the Commissioner need not prove the unreasonableness of the
filing.275 After a filing is made, however, fundamental fairness and statutory
provisions mandate that, "when the Commissioner knows prior to the giving
of public notice 'in what respect and to what extent he contends such filing
fails to comply with the requirements of [the 1977 Rating Law],' then he must
give the specifics in his notice of public hearing. ' 276 Because the Commissioner "knew the data was not audited" and because "the verification method-

ology was consistent with that employed in previous years," which "had not
required audited data," he failed to give the required notice "with respect to
265. Id at 389-91, 269 S.E.2d at 556-57. The opinion in 1980 Insurance Case I, the "new
hornbook," is preceded by an index and is organized superbly. It deals with general administrative law, and is certain to receive comprehensive commentary. See, e.g., Markham, 4 Powerless
Judiciary? The North Carolina Courts' Perceptions ofReview ofAdministrative Action, 12 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 21, 25 (1980). Here, however, commentary centers on rate regulation.
266. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.26 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The six percent "cap" has since been
replaced by a cap based on the percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index over the prior 16
months. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.26 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
267. 300 N.C. at 392, 269 S.E.2d at 557.
268. IZdat 394, 269 S.E.2d at 558.
269. Id at 396-420, 269 S.E.2d at 558-72.
270. Id at 440-48, 269 S.E.2d at 584-88.
271. Id at 448-53, 269 S.E.2d at 588-91.
272. Id at 429, 269 S.E.2d at 577.
273. See, e.g., In re North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 275 N.C. 15, 32, 165 S.E.2d 207,
219 (1969). But cf. State ex rel Commissioner of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 40 N.C.
App. 85, 96, 252 S.E.2d 811, 819, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 452, 256 S.E.2d 810 (1979) (Commissioner
has burden of affirmatively showing filing proponent has not carried its burden of proof).
274. 300 N.C. at 454-55, 269 S.E.2d at 592.
275. Id at 455, 269 S.E.2d at 592.
276. Id at 457, 269 S.E.2d at 593 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.21(a) (Cum. Supp.
1981)).
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the reliability of the data" in disapproving the filing. 2 7 7 On the specificity
deemed appropriate for a disapproval order, the court added dictum that the
"statute requires the Commissioner to be mathematically specific in rejecting
proposed rate increases and future orders should specify 'wherein and to what
'273
extent' the proposed filings are deemed improper.
Commissioner Ingram's primary ground for disapproving the 1977 filing
was that "unaudited data in an insurance rate-making hearing is unreliable
and incredible. '2 79 First, the court held that *Commissioner Ingram acted
within his statutory authority in requiring "that data submitted in an insurance rate-making case be audited." 280 The court recognized the "established
rule," said to be "in accord with well-established principles," that "the Commissioner has, in the regulation of insurance rates, only such authority as has
been conferred upon him by statute. ' 28 1 The cases applying the rule to restrict
the authority of the Commissioner, such as the Energy Crisis Case and 1974
Automobile Liabiliy Filing, were regarded by the court as correct "in [a] limited context" but were "clearly distinguishable." 282 In construing statutory
provisions, including one authorizing a requirement of "any other data necessary to compile statistics, 2833 the court concluded that there was statutory authority for "such reasonable roles and regulations" deemed necessary to
discharge the delegated statutory duties.2 84 Thus, the Commissioner could
require "that data submitted in a rate-making case be audited. '2 85 Within the
same context, the court added that it is for the Commissioner, "in an adjudicatory proceeding, to determine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence and
the credibility of the witnesses. '28 6 It affirmed "the Commissioner's election
to accord the necessary weight and credibility to the testimony of the single
uncontested expert witness testifying on auditing. '28 7 Reaffirming the Commissioner's authority to consider competent evidence other than statistical
data from the rating bureau, established earlier in 1974 Automobile Liability
Filing28 8 and House Bill 28 Automobile,28 9 the court regarded its decisions as
277. Id at 456-57, 269 S.E.2d at 593.
278. Id at 456, 269 S.E.2d at 592-93 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.21(a) (Cum. Supp.

1981)).

279. Id at 394, 269 S.E.2d at 558. That credibility conclusion is distinguishable from the
admissibility considerations before the court when it reviewed and reluctantly affirmed the evidentiary and statistical bases for a filing in In re North Carolina Automobile Rate Office, 278 N.C.
at 320-21, 180 S.E.2d at 168. In 1980Insurance Casel the Rate Bureau argued that "the collection
of insurance statistical data is an unbelievably complex process which has been painstakingly
developed and meticulously documented" and that the methods are the same "as in 47 other
states." 300 N.C. at 405, 269 S.E.2d at 564-65.
280. 300 N.C. at 408, 269 S.E.2d at 566.
281. Id at 398-99, 269 S.E.2d at 560-61.
282. Id at 398, 269 S.E.2d at 561.
283. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.18(d) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
284. 300 N.C. at 400, 269 S.E.2d at 562.
285. Id at 408, 269 S.E.2d at 566.
286. Id at 406, 269 S.E.2d at 565.
287. Id
288. 292 N.C. at 18, 231 S.E.2d at 876.
289. 293 N.C. at 384-85, 239 S.E.2d at 60. The court in 1980 Insurance Case I noted the
remark it had made earlier in HouseM'l1284utomoble that "there is nothing sacrosanct about so-

1982]

INSURANCE RATE REGULATION

having "stressed
the Commissioner's statutory ability to compel special statis'290
tical data.
Second, the court held that the Commissioner's attempted rule requiring
audited data, although otherwise authorized, was unlawful because he violated the general administrative rulemaking requirements of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act. 29 1 Agreeing "that the Commissioner
converted a rate-making case into a rule-making hearing and thereby violated" prescribed administrative procedures, the court held that the "change292of
policy" worked "hardship" and was an "inequity" of "striking example."
Under the third standard of review, the court held that Commissioner
Ingram's order requiring audited data was "arbitrary and capricious" for
seven specified reasons. 293 In summary, the court added, "[the] order is
to enunciate a substantial rule involving
grossly imprecise in attempting
294
sweeping ramifications."
2. "Excessive" Rates and Income on Invested Capital
The court found error as a matter of law in Commissioner Ingram's conclusion "that the proposed rate increase was 'excessive to the extent that investment income is not properly taken into account.'"295 Without any
elaboration on the meaning of the statutory standard "excessive,"' the court
dwelled upon the 1977 Rating Law provision for "a reasonable margin for
underwriting profit." 296 Because the 1977 filing reflected investment income
on unearned premium and loss reserves, the court narrowed the question
"solely to consideration of investment income on invested capital."2 97 The
court distinguished the underwriting and investment undertaldngs of insurance companies, and concluded that in North Carolina neither precedent nor
statutes permit consideration of investment income from invested capital instead of investment income from unearned premium and loss reserves.
Before that conclusion, the court carefully considered earlier cases. It
cited without criticism the early Kansas Aetna return-on-capital case for "the
called 'insurance statistics."' 300 N.C. at 408, 269 S.E.2d at 566 (quoting 293 N.C. at 384, 239
S.E.2d at 60).
290. 300 N.C. at 407, 269 S.E.2d at 566.
291. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-1 to -64 (Cum. Supp. 1981). For a discussion of this aspect of
the case, see Powell, Pressingthe NCAPA Paradigtr Too Much FormforAd Hoc Adudicatory
Rulemaking, 61 N.C.L. REV. 67 (1982).
292. 300 N.C. at 409, 269 S.E.2d at 567.
293. The court held that the order was vague and uncertain because 1) it did not establish the
extent to which examination of "original source documents" was required; 2) it did not specify
whether the auditing had to be done by Certified Public Accountants; 3) it did not specify the
degree of precision required; 4) it did not provide appellants with adequate guidelines for compliance; 5) it included no determination of the economic feasibility of compliance; 6) it included no
determination whether statutory time limits could be complied with; and 7) it included no determination whether "original source data" were even available for past years. Id at 420, 269 S.E.2d
at 573.
294. I1d at 420-21, 269 S.E.2d at 573.
295. Id at 440, 269 S.E.2d at 584.
296. Id at 441, 269 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.19 (Cum. Supp. 1981)).
297. Id (emphasis in original).
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opposing view,"' 298 but found "our view consistent with that prevailing in
other jurisdictions" that apply the Bullion underwriting-profit approach, such
as Pennsylvania in the City of Philadelphia case. 299 After reviewing earlier
comments by Justice Lake in In re North CarolinaFire InsuranceRatingBureau where the question "was not correctly before the Court" 30 0 and in In re
North CarolinaAutomobile Rate Administrative Office where the question "was
more directly addressed by Chief Justice Bobbitt,"'30 1 the court passed, without
comment upon Justice Lake's dissent in the latter case, to consideration of the
court of appeals cases that had rejected return-on-capital arguments based
upon that dissent. 30 2 In 1980 Insurance Case I the supreme court concluded
that "these and other decisions establish clearly that it has never been the law
from invested capital is to be considered in an
in this jurisdiction that income
30 3
insurance ratemaking case."
3. "Underwriting Profit" and the "Capital Asset Pricing Model"
Although its holding on investment income foreclosed use of the "capital
asset pricing model," the court added, in apparent dictum, its disapproval of
Commissioner Ingram's adoption of the "model. ' '3°4 The Commissioner had
"in essence rejected the traditiorial five percent of gross premium [allowance]
and adopted a complicated, lengthy and novel formula for determining underwriting profit allowance" known as the "capital asset pricing model. '30 The
model formula, explained in expert testimony, had received "general approval" in a 1976 Massachusetts case. 30 6 It "clearly contemplates consideration of income on invested capital," and by using "a hypothetical 'risk free'
rate of return. . . only contemplates that the rate of return would be computed by the hypothetical assumption that the companies did so invest their
funds." 30 7

The court did "not reject the Commissioner's formula because it is either
complicated, lengthy, or novel," and noted that he is not required to be
"unimaginative," especially "in dealing with technical and complicated matters such as that presented by this issue." 30 8 Nevertheless, it found Commis' 30 9
sioner Ingram's adoption of the formula "erroneous as a matter of law."
First, the court observed that "consideration of income from invested capital is
not presently allowed by North Carolina law. Obviously, striking such an in298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id
Id at 444-45, 269 S.E.2d at 586.
Id at 442, 269 S.E.2d at 585.
Id
Id at 443, 269 S.E.2d at 585. See cases cited supra fhotes 159-61.
300 N.C. at 444, 269 S.E.2d at 586.
Id at 450-51, 269 S.E.2d at 589-90.

305. Id at 448, 269 S.E.2d at 588.
306. Id at 451,269 S.E.2d at 590 (citing Attorney General v. Commissioner of Ins., 370 Mass.
791, 353 N.E.2d 745 (1976)).
307. Id at 450, 269 S.E.2d at 589.
308. Id at 449-50, 269 S.E.2d at 589.
309. Id at 450, 269 S.E.2d at 589.
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tegral part of the formula causes it to fall in its entirety.' 3 10° Second, to assume
"a hypothetical 'risk free' rate of return" when statutes authorize "ten different
categories of investments" even for reserves would be "inconceivable" and
would "clearly violate" legislative intent, making "a mockery of the
3 11
statute."
Moreover, the court found adoption of the formula to be "arbitrary and
capricious. ' 3 12 The court concluded that Commissioner Ingram "based his
new formula solely on the basis of the testimony of" an employee of the Massachusetts insurance department and a 1976 decision of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, which had generally affirmed the approach. 3 13 With
deference to both the witness and that decision, the court found that Commissioner Ingram "has simply copied a complicated equation of an experiment in
another state without proceeding with the careful and deliberate manner that
had been employed in that state."'3 14 After finding "significant distinguishing
factors" in the Massachusetts case and noting that court's "several criticisms"
of the formula's rationale, the court concluded: 'The point is simply that the
Commissioner... did nothing more, in adopting a complicated and novel
formula for determining underwriting profit, than listen to one employee of an
adopted and
insurance department in a sister state which is refining-the policy
315
which was given only limited approval by" its appellate court.
4. "Unfairly Discriminatory" Rates and the Reinsurance Facility
The Reinsurance Facility, a 1973 statutory creation, 3 16 also submitted a
filing under the 1977 Rating Law. As summarized by the court, "the Facility
represents a pool which insures [automobile liability] risks which companies
determine they do not want to individually insure." 3 17 The filing proposed

that rates for risks covered through the Facility "be 10% higher than the proposed rates for risks voluntarily retained" by the companies. 318 Commissioner
Ingram concluded, and the court of appeals agreed, that the ten percent rate
differential was unfairly discriminatory. 319 The supreme court, however, applying the whole record test, held that there was insubstantial evidence in the
record to support the Commissioner's findings and conclusions of unfair
310. Id
311. Id at 450-51, 269 S.E.2d at 589.
312. Id at 451, 269 S.E.2d at 590.
313. Id

314. Id
315. Id at 453, 269 S.E.2d at 591.
316. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-248.26 to -.39 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
317. 300 N.C. at 424, 269 S.E.2d at 575. Before statutory authority for the Facility was enacted in 1973, Commissioner Ingram attempted to effect a similar pool by administrative order,

but his plan was enjoined. See North Carolina Auto. Ins. Plan v. Commissioner of Ins., 73 CVS
2053, General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, Wake County, North Carolina. The
Facility's predecessor assigned risk plan was upheld in Jones v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,
270 N.C. 454, 155 S.E.2d 119 (1967).
318. 300 N.C. at 422, 269 S.E.2d at 574.
319. Id at 423, 269 S.E.2d at 574.
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discrimination. 320
The statutory standards for separate Reinsurance Facility rates, authorized by 1977 amendments, are familiar: "Rates shall be neither excessive, in.adequate nor unfairly discriminatory."' 32' By special provision, however, all
Facility "rates shall be on an actuarially sound basis and shall be calculated,
insofar as is possible, to produce neither a profit nor a loss. '' 322 They "shall
not include any factor for underwriting profit on Facility business, but shall
provide an allowance for contingencies." 323 There is a statutory "strong pre'324
sumption" that they "are neither unreasonable nor excessive."
Applying the whole record test under the statutory substantial evidence
standard of review, the court carefully considered the statistical comparisons
of Facility and voluntary risk policyholders. It found the record "replete with
evidence indicating that the proposed differential for the rate increase between
ceded and voluntary business is actuarially justified. '325 It noted that Commissioner Ingram had "made no findings with respect to the statutory standard
'actuarially sound,'" and subsequently found that the "plain legislative intent
is that Facility rates can be higher than those for the voluntary market if a
higher Facility rate is actuarially indicated. ' 326 The court's central conclusion
on the issue was, therefore, "that the Commissioner failed to consider material
and substantial evidence concerning the actuarial soundness of the statistics
aAd that the findings which the Commissioner made, while supported by the
' 327
evidence, are legally irrelevant.
That conclusion could not be overcome by arguments of "unfair" discrimination under the statutory standard.3 2 8 Regarding the statutory standard, however, the court predicted "that until clear guidelines are established
either by the Legislature or by the Commissioner, confusion will continue to
abound over the phrase 'unfair rate discrimination.' "329 Finding that "the
phrase is not defined in our statutes nor, for that matter, in the model laws and
is a source of continuing controversy," the court invited a policymaking
"formula for. . . fairness" as a cure for the "vagueness now present.."' ' 30
In the context of Commissioner Ingram's "battleground," as the first and
controlling case under the 1977 Rating Law, 1980 InsuranceCase I represents
the turning point of the battle. It is the precedent for rate-making procedure
under the 1977 Rating Law, and is the most definitive North Carolina decision
to date on the meaning of the familiar standards for all lines. Moreover, the
320.

Id

at 430-34, 269 S.E.2d at 578-81.

321. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.33(1) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
322. Id

323. Id
324. Id

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

300 N.C. at 431, 269 S.E.2d at 579.
Id at 434, 269 S.E.2d at 580.
Id at 433, 269 S.E.2d at 580.
Id at 434-35, 269 S.E.2d at 581.
Id at 437, 269 S.E.2d at 582.
Id at 438, 269 S.E.2d at 583.
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1980 decision's dictum concerning the Facility may have presaged Commissioner Ingram's defeat on a pending battle on the Facility front.
E. The Battle Over Recoupment Surcharges on the Facility Front
In 198 1 the supreme court in State ex rel Hunt v. North Carolina Reinsurance Facility33 1 resolved a "crucial" issue: whether recoupment surcharges
imposed by the Reinsurance Facility are rates required to be filed with the
Commissioner. The Commissioner, joined by the Attorney General and Governor in an action against the Facility and its 293 member insurance companies, sought to enjoin collection of the two initial recoupment surcharges
commenced by the Facility in 1980. One surcharge, pursuant to 1977 statutory
amendments associated with the 1977 Rating Law, was to recoup Facility
losses of $31.4 million for its 1978 fiscal year. 332 The other surcharge, pursuant to a 1979 amendment, was to recoup a reduction in Facility income resulting from a requirement that rates charged to statutorily defined "clean risks"
ceded to the Facility do not exceed rates charged to "clean risks" insured in
the voluntary market.333 The surcharges were imposed as percentages of premiums on automobile insurance policies issued during a year after imposition.
The first surcharge was 18.6 percent of the premium on all policies ceded to
the Facility, and the latter was 1.1 percent of the premium on both ceded and
The Commissioner contended that the
voluntary-market policies. 334
surcharges were rates to be filed with him in accordance with the 1977 Rating
335
Law, under which they arguably would be subject to his disapproval power.
The supreme court limited its decision to the single issue whether the
surcharges are "rates" within the statutory meaning.33 6 Neither "rates" nor
"rate" is defined by the applicable statutes. 337 Nevertheless, no specific authority supported the Commissioner's contentions. 338 The supreme court,
viewing the separate statutory provisions as part of a single scheme, held as a
matter of statutory interpretation that "the Legislature intended the 'rates' to
have a single and consistent meaning throughout and that 'rates' does not enincluding filing and review, the
compass within its definition, for any purpose,
339
types of surcharges challenged here."
The court also found other reasons for that interpretation. First, noting
that the terms "rate" and "premium" are used interchangeably in the statutes,
the court added that they have well-established definitions as expressed in a
331. 302 N.C. 274, 275 S.E.2d 399 (1981) [hereinafter referred to as Recoupment Surcharges

Case].

332. Id at 286, 275 S.E.2d at 404.
333. Id at 287, 275 S.E.2d at 404-05.

334. Id
335. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-124.19 (Cum. Supp. 1981).

336. Id at 287, 275 S.E.2d at 405. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-2480) (Cum. Supp. 1981).
337. 302 N.C. at 287, 275 S.E.2d at 405.
338. Id
339. Id at 289, 275 S.E.2d at 406.
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leading34insurance
text.3 40 The court noted record evidence on the meaning of
"rate," 1 and quoted a common dictionary definition: "the amount of premium per unit of insurance or exposure." 342 Earlier opinions had referred to
'343
"premium rates."

The court repeated its In re North CarolinaAutomobile Rate Office enunciation of the components of casualty insurance premiums 344 and summarized
the factors enumerated in the 1977 Rating Law to be considered in establishing rates.345 Recognizing that rate-making is a prospective process, the court
relied upon House Bill 28 Motorcycle, the Energy Crisis Case, and In re North
CarolinaFire Insurance Rating Bureau: "We have said on numerous occasions that the purpose of the rate-making process is to ensure that premiums
are adequate to cover anticipatedlosses and anticpatedexpenses and to allow
347
a reasonable profit."' 346 The process is "an attempt to predict the future."

Thus, although the factors enumerated in the 1977 Rating Law indicate that
"past loss experience may be considered, it is relevant only to the extent of
predicting future events." The court found nothing in the rate-making statute
"which indicates that past losses themselves constitute a component of the
rate."3 48 The recoupment surcharges, however, generally are retroactive and
"can be determined by simple mathematical computation" of past conditions.
The surcharges, authorized for recoupment of past losses, are not future rates.
The court recognized that the Facility had suffered tremendous financial
losses pursuant to the statutory scheme. 349 Indeed, in the first five years from
its 1973 inception, the Facility had lost over $109 million.35 0 Just before these
initial surcharges became effective, the Facility's approximately $13.6 million
available for payment of claims was being exhausted at a rate of approximately $3 million per month.3 5 ' Thus, without the recoupment surcharges,
'the Facility's funds soon would have been exhausted.
In upholding the surcharges for recoupment of those losses resulting from
the "serious inadequacy of Facility rates," the court may have saved the Facility and the rate-making statutory scheme from challenges that they were unconstitutionally confiscatory. In defense of the recoupment surcharges, some
of the Facility's member companies had challenged the constitutionality, absent recoupment, of the Facility and the rate-making statutory scheme, as well
340. Id at 289, 291, 275 S.E.2d at 407 (citing C. KULP & J. HALL, supra note 29, at 765).
341. Id at 292, 275 S.E.2d at 407.
342. Id at 291,275 S.E.2d at 407 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNAY 1884 (1971)).
343. See, e.g., In re North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 275 N.C. 15, 28, 165 S.E.2d 207,
217 (1969). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-9.4 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
344. 302 N.C. at 291, 275 S.E.2d at 407 (quoting 278 N.C. at 312, 180 S.E.2d at 162-63).
345. Id at 294, 275 S.E.2d at 408-09.
346. Id at 291-92, 275 S.E.2d at 407.
347. Id at 291, 275 S.E.2d at 407.
348. Id at 293, 275 S.E.2d at 408.
349. Id at 286, 275 S.E.2d at 404.

350. Record at 318, State ex rel Hunt v. North Carolina Reinsurance Facility, 302 N.C. 274,
275 S.E.2d 399 (1981).
351. 302 N.C. at 294, 275 S.E.2d at 409.
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as the six percent "cap" on automobile insurance rate increases. 3 52 The companies, which had borne earlier Facility losses, would continue to bear the
Facility losses absent recoupment. 3 53 With recoupment, their confiscatoryan earlier challenge had
rate challenges would be effectively eliminated, just3 as
54
been effectively mooted by the 1977 amendments.
The Recoupment Surcharges Case represents more than just another serious conflict between the companies and the Commissioner; it is a significant
symptom of underlying ills. It arose after years of inadequate rates and millions of dollars of resulting Facility losses 355 and reflected both the compounded complexity of imposing a six percent "cap" 356 on rate increases in a
market confused by "clean risks" 357 concepts and the prohibition of consideration of high-risk young male drivers in automobile insurance rate-making
classifications. 358 The decision is important in other ways as well. Procedurally, the case is significant because the court decided it upon plaintiffs' appeal
from an order denying their motion for a preliminary injunction and because
the opinion silently avoided some complex issues. 359 Substantively, it pro352. E.g., Record at 89-106, State ex rel Hunt v. North Carolina Reinsurance Facility, 302
N.C. 274, 275 S.E.2d 399 (1981).
353. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-248.34(e) (Cum. Supp. 1981). The plaintiffs in the Becoupment
Surcharges Case argued that assessment of the Facility member companies provided "a ready
source for the Facility's cash problems." Appellants' Brief at 65, State ex rel Hunt v. North
Carolina Reinsurance Facility, 302 N.C. 274,275 S.E.2d 399 (1981). In other actions in which the
Facility had undertaken equitable pro rata assessment of member companies pursuant to G.S. 58248.34(e) and recoupment of that assessment by way of an identifiable surcharge pursuant to G.S.
58-248.34(0, the same plaintiffs contested the recoupment. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hunt v. North
Carolina Reinsurance Facility, 80 CVS 1492, General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division,
Wake County, North Carolina. After the decision in Recoupment Surcharges Case, the plaintiffs
dismissed those other actions.
354. Before enactment of the 1977 amendments, the Facility and four of its member companies commenced a civil action challenging the application of the rating laws and the Facility Act
as allegedly resulting in confiscatory rates. North Carolina Reinsurance Facility v. Ingram, Civil
Action No. 77-0034-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C.). The plaintiffs dismissed the action in 1978.
355. See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 333-34 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
359. 302 N.C. at 280, 275 S.E.2d at 400-01. The supreme court decided the case on a single
substantive issue and expressed no opinion regarding the propriety of issuing a preliminary injunction or whether the appeal should be dismissed as interlocutory because it was from denial of
a preliminary injunction. "Suffice it to say that pursuant to our supervisory and discretionary
power we find the procedural context of the matter before us to be such that we can adequately
deal with the substantive issue presented in a controversy which is obviously demanding of
prompt resolution." Id at 283, 275 S.E.2d at 402. Some defendants challenged the standing of
the Governor, the Commissioner, and the Attorney General to contest the constitutionality of the
recoupment surcharge amendments because plaintiffs sought to establish standing based only
upon the rights of the using and consuming public. Those defendants, however, did not challenge
the standing of the Commissioner or the Attorney General to seek a declaratory judgment interpreting the amendments. They also sought to have the Governor dismissed on the grounds that he
was not a real party in interest and that no statute allows him to bring such an action in the name
of the State for the use and benefit of another. Appellees' Brief, at 138-46; Defendant-Appellants'
New Brief, at 20-25, State ex ret Hunt v. North Carolina Reinsurance Facility, 302 N.C. 274, 275
S.E.2d 399 (1981). Compare State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 288 N.C. 381, 218 S.E.2d
364 (1975), with State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. Vines, 274 N.C. 486, 164 S.E.2d 161 (1968). See
also Winslow v. Morton, 118 N.C. 486, 24 S.E. 417 (1896); James v. Hunt, 43 N.C. App. 109, 258
S.E.2d 481 (1979).
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vides unique precedent for surcharges, 3 60 although the court applied statutes it
'36 1
said were "confusing and unwieldy.
The Battles On Other Fronts

F

In the entire "Hornbook," one rating statute was sufficiently clear for the
supreme court to sustain Commissioner Ingram's action.3 62 The case involved
a special statutory provision for a ten percent discount from premium for mobile-homeowner policies with approved tie-down provisions. 363 The Commissioner approved the proposal of the rating bureau that the discount be applied
to the total basic premium. One company argued that the discount should be
applied only to that portion of premium applicable to wind-loss perils, which
arguably are more affected by a tie-down. 3 64 The supreme court sustained the
Commissioner's approval of the bureau filing. 365 The decision rested upon an
interpretation of the statutory provision for the premium discount, and is of
limited significance. The case involved a legislative mandate "to decrease the
premium by ten percent," 366 and is distinguishable from other decisions dealing with determinations of rates that would yield a fair and reasonable profit.
In cases focusing upon the determination of "reasonable" rates, the Commissioner has lost on all fronts. Accompanying the automobile insurance decision in 1980 Insurance Case I were 1980 Insurance Case 11367 involving a
subsequent automobile insurance filing, 1980 Insurance Case IJP68 involving
a homeowners' insurance rate filing, and 1980 Insurance Case rP "369 involving
a workers' compensation insurance rate filing. All arose under the 1977 Rating Law, were decided the same day as and at least partially were controlled
by 1980 InsuranceCaseI. Earlier, these separate lines of insurance had fought
on separate fronts 370 in court battles with the Commissioner, where they
equally were frustrated by delays, but ultimately they were as successful as the
371
automobile insurance line.
Not all lines of insurance are subject to rate regulation. For instance,
credit life insurance rates were not subject to rate-making authority when
360. See McCulough II, supra note 4.
361. 302 N.C. at 298, 275 S.E.2d at 411.
362. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 292 N.C. 244, 232 S.E.2d 414 (1977).

363. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-131.3A (Cum. Supp. 1981).
364. 292 N.C. at 245, 232 S.E.2d at 417.
365. Id at 250, 232 S.E.2d at 419.
366. Id at 248-49, 232 S.E.2d at 418-19.

367. State exmel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 460, 269 S.E.2d 547
(1980).

368. State exrel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 474, 269 S.E.2d 595
(1980).
369. State exrel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 485, 269 S.E.2d 602

(1980).
370. See supra notes 132-34.
371. See, e.g., State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 292
N.C. 471, 234 S.E.2d 720 (1977) (homeowner's insurance "deemer" clause); State ex re. Comm'r
of Ins. v. Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau, 36 N.C. App. 98, 242 S.E.2d 887 (1978)

(1974 workers' compensation insurance rate filing).

1982]

INSUReANCE RATE REGULA4TION

Commissioner Ingram began hearings to examine them. 372 His resulting order, setting "maximum premium rates for credit life insurance at approximately one-half the prevailing premium rates then being charged," was
appealed by affected companies. 373 The court of appeals rejected Commis-

sioner Ingram's argued authority, which was based upon analogy and "custom
and practices" of former Commissioners, and vacated the order. 374 The court
of appeals held that nothing in the statutes granted Commissioner Ingram the
express or implied authority to set rates for credit life insurance. The court
cited two early rate-making decisions, In re North CarolinaAutomobile Rate
Office and In re North CarolinaFire Insurance Rating Bureau, for the basic
"must be conferred by statute" with "suffirule that rate-making authority
375
ciently clear standards.
In these two insurance rate-making decisions, the supreme court had
questioned the sufficiency of the familiar statutory standards. 376 Those concerns, slumbering somewhat during intervening decisions, reawakened in
379
1977, 377 in 1980 Insurance Case 1378 and the Recoupment Surcharges Case.
Despite those expressions of dissatisfaction with the standards, the supreme
court did not decide the issue in the only direct challenge to the sufficiency of
those rate-making standards. The challenging case, HartfordAccidentandIndemnity Co. v. Ingram, 38 0 concerned a statute empowering the Commissioner
to establish rates for health care liability insurance at an initial stage simply on
the basis of the latest available statistical data.38 1 Subsequent rate changes,
also to be established by the Commissioner, were subject to the familiar standards of being "reasonable, adequate, not excessive, not unfairly discriminatory and in the public interest." 382 The statute also prescribed parameters for
those standards, including a provision for anticipated losses and expenses and
"a fair and reasonable underwriting profit" taking into consideration investment income from unearned premium and loss reserves. 38 3 The trial court
found the statutory standards insufficient for setting rates for the main subject
of the statute, medical malpractice liability insurance. 384 The sufficiency of
the standards was not determinative in the supreme court's decision that held
372. State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. Integon Life Ins. Co., 28 N.C. App. 7, 220 S.E.2d 409

(1975).
373. Id at 8, 220 S.E.2d at 410.
374. Id at 9-10, 220 S.E.2d at 414.
375. Id at 9, 10, 220 S.E.2d at 411-12.
376. 278 N.C. at 315, 180 S.E.2d at 164; 275 N.C. at 29, 165 S.E.2d at 217.
377. See State exrel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 471,
490, 234 S.E.2d 720, 730 (1977) ("a statutory plan for rate-making so ambiguous and unclear").

378. 300 N.C. at 437, 269 S.E.2d at 577.
379. 302 N.C. at 298, 275 S.E.2d at 401-02.
380. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ingram, 290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498 (1976).

381. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-173.47 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
382. Id
383. Id
384. Record at 313-14, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ingram, 290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d

498 (1976).
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385
the statute unconstitutional on a broader basis.

Hartford nevertheless has significance in the rate-making context. It
arose during the mid-1970s' "medical malpractice insurance crisis." 386 In
North Carolina and nationally, companies writing medical malpractice liability insurance began withdrawing from or limiting their underwritings in that
market.387 Many issues were involved nationally, 388 but in North Carolina

inadequate rates and Commissioner Ingram's refusal to approve proposed rate
increases and a policy form change precipitated a "crisis"-the possible withdrawal from the market of the company writing a high percentage of the coverage. 38 9 At Commissioner Ingram's urging, 390 the General Assembly enacted

a statute requiring general liability insurers to write medical malpractice insurance.3 91 In consolidated proceedings brought by 346 general liability insurers,
the supreme court held that the state could not constitutionally compel them to
case on the issue of
write medical malpractice insurance. 392 It is the leading 393
compelling an insurer to write another line of insurance.

The court rejected as an answer to the basic constitutional objection the
statutory provision that rates "be 'reasonable' and 'adequate' and sufficient to
yield 'a fair and reasonable underwriting profit' over and above 'anticipated
losses' and 'anticipated expenses.' ,,394 Fulfillment of that statutory promise
was not certain because "the losses and expenses 'anticipated' by the Commissioner in the establishment of premium rates may easily prove substantially
less than those actually incurred." 395 This one-sentence dictum deals with two
broad but distinct dimensions of Hartford. Interrelated in this context, they
are the potential denial of due process, both procedurally and substantively,
397
because of regulatory bias396 resulting in inadequate or confiscatory rates.

385. 290 N.C. at 467, 226 S.E.2d at 508.
386. During the crisis, highly publicized especially in California and New York, some doctors
publicly threatened not to treat patients unless the doctors obtained the malpractice insurance they
desired. See, eg., NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 58-65.
Record at 8-9, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Ingram, 290 N.C. 457,226
387. See,e.g.,
S.E.2d 498 (1976).
388. See, eg., St. Paul Fire & Marine Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 275 Md. 130, 339 A.2d 291 (1975).
389. Record at 9, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Ingram, 290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498
(1976).
390. Press release of John Ingram, Commissioner of Insurance, July 29, 1975, Record at 9,
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Ingram, 290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498 (1976), Exhibit 27.
391. See note 381 supra.
392. 290 N.C. at 467, 226 S.E.2d at 508. The court held that the requirement violated the due
process clause of the federal Constitution and the equal protection clause and prohibition against
the deprivation of one's liberty except by law of the land in the North Carolina Constitution.
393. Carter, The Limits of Regulatory Powers of Insurance Commissioners-An Industry Viewpoint, 13 FORUM 403, 413 (1978).
394. 290 N.C. at 469, 226 S.E.2d at 506.
395. Id
396. See, eg., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 324 A.2d 878 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct.
1974).
397. See note 93 supra. Regardless of the statutory standard or the administrative procedure
for ratemaking, due process standards apply. See Utilities Comm'n v. Telephone Co., 269 N.C.
369, 132 S.E.2d 904 (1963).
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Hartfordimplicitly recognized the potential bias of the ratemaker or regulator whose approval is required for rate changes. The companies anticipated
the argument that they had not exhausted their administrative remedies and,
in their direct challenge to the statute, alleged that they had inadequate remedies for establishing rates that were not confiscatory. 398 They alleged that

Commissioner Ingram would act not as a quasi-judicial adjudicator in estab-

lishing rates but as an advocate of rates that were inadequate. 399 In an initial

temporary restraining order and subsequent preliminary injunctions enjoining
enforcement of the statute, the trial court agreed that the companies had inadequate administrative remedies.4 °° At trial, the companies' evidence included
copies of Commissioner Ingram's press releases and speeches, 40 1 his "Con40 3
sumer News," 40 2 and a chronology of all insurance rate cases heard by him.
The trial court found a "history of inaction or delay in action on major rate
and rate related filings.''404 Neither the trial court nor the supreme court,
which noted the record's "disturbing clarity" regarding past rate inadequacy, 405 reached the related issue whether Commissioner Ingram's bias had
contributed to continuation of the rate inadequacy. Thus, Haqford's implicit
recognition of regulatory bias may be of only limited significance. Indeed, the
supreme court later passed over similar bias arguments. 40 6 In 1974Automobile
Liabili7y Filing, however, an administrative appeal rather than a direct attack
with record evidence such as in Hartford, the supreme court rejected arguments that Commissioner Ingram had acted with unconstitutional bias as a
the Comconsumer advocate.40 7 Nevertheless, the court has since'40recognized
8
missioner's and the companies' "polarization of views."
The issue of confiscatory rates was also present in both Hartfordand 1974
Automobile Liability Filing. The trial court in Hartford made findings of fact
and conclusions of law regarding rates it adjudged to be confiscatory. 40 9 The
supreme court noted that portion of the judgment in its statement of the
case,4 10 but did not, in connection with its broader holding, confront the confiscation issue. In its subsequent disposition of the administrative appeal in
1974.Automobile LiabilityFiling, in which the record lacked direct evidence of
398. Record at 10-11.
399. Id at 11.
400. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Ingram, 75 CVS 4191, General Court of
Justice, Superior Court Division, Wake County, North Carolina. The temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunctions were not appealed and were not parts of the record on appeal in

Commissioner Ingram's appeal from the final judgment.
401. Record at 108, Exhibit 27.

402. Id, Exhibit 28.
403. Id, Exhibit 26.

404. Id at 298.
405. 290 N.C. at 469, 226 S.E.2d at 506.
406. See State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 293 N.C.
365, 392-93, 239 S.E.2d 48, 63-64 (1977).
407. 292 N.C. at 27, 231 S.E.2d at 881.
408. That recognition was as recent as 1980 InsuranceCase I, 300 N.C. at 18, 269 S.E.2d at
410.
409. Record at 298-99, 320-21.
410. 290 N.C. at 458-59, 226 S.E.2d at 500.
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confiscation comparable to that in Hartford,4 11 the supreme court stated that it
found nothing in Commissioner Ingram's order that subjected the companies
to confiscatory rates.412 The court's limited comments on confiscation are significant, however, because the subject has rarely been reached in insurance
413
rate-making cases.
In the rate-making context, Hartford'ssignificance arises from its implications. It may point to answers on the issues of bias and confiscation. Its implicit recognition of regulatory bias may lead to a finding of bias in the
continuing rate-making battle. Moreover, the trial court's confiscatory rate
conclusions, including a definition 41 4 of confiscatory rates that was neither disapproved nor disclaimed by the supreme court despite its other dicta, may
extend a controlling influence should the confiscation issue arise again.415
IV.

THE "HORNBOOK" AND CONCLUSIONS

The early "reasonable" standard and its refined model bill rate-making
standards have survived the North Carolina battleground, but they are battle
scarred by the North Carolina Supreme Court's skepticism over their sufficiency as statutory standards. 41 6 Like a battered string instrument, the standards still can be heard if tuned: one string, now perhaps worn thin, sounding
state-regulation immunity from the federal antitrust laws; a loose string for the
intended broad discretionary power of the Commissioner; and tighter ones for
attuning the Commissioner to his statutory authority. They play the basic battletune for all marchers on the rate-making battleground. With Commissioner
Ingram and the companies marching to the beats of different drummers, the
courts have been called upon to orchestrate. The musical metaphor matches
the "harmonious scheme" that the supreme court attuned from parts of the
statutes, 4 17 and underscores a court's correct role in the conflict-a judicious
conductor, interpreting the battletune, but never writing the music or singing a
battlecry. In that role, the courts have reached for a familiar baton, the statutory provisions for scope of judicial review.
411. See Defendant-Appellees' New Brief at 43-45, State ex rel Comm'r v. North Carolina

Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 292 N.C. 1,231 S.E.2d 867 (1977). See also Defendant-Appellees' New
Brief at 26-29, State ex rel Comm'r. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 293 N.C. 365,
239 S.E.2d 48 (1977).
412. 292 N.C. at 27, 231 S.E.2d at 881.
413. See supra note 93.
414. Record at 320, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ingram, 290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498
(1976):
Rates that do not allow plaintiffs, individually or collectively, to receive income from the
writing of a line of insurance, including medical malpractice insurance, sufficient to pay
the losses and expenses incurred thereby, which rates thereby cause losses to plaintiffs
that can be covered only from the other property of each, are confiscatory rates constituting deprivation of property without due process of law, in violation of the Law of the
Land Clause, Article I, Section 19 of the Constitution of North Carolina, and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
415. See supra note 93.
416. See supra notes 376-79.
417. State ex rel Hunt v. North Carolina Reinsurance Facility, 302 N.C. 274, 289, 275 S.E.2d
399, 409 (1981).
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All of the North Carolina "Hornbook" cases applied specified standards
of judicial review.4 18 The supreme court pointedly has related its holdings to
the standards. 4 19 Both the separate rate-case standards420 and the general
provisions of the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act 421 have been
418. Appeals from the Commissioner's orders are pursuant to two statutory provisions;- N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 58-9.3, 58-9.4 (Cum. Supp. 1981). G.S. 58-9.3 applies in non-rate and classification
cases, with appeals to the Wake County Superior Court, and G.S. 58-9.4 applies to rate and classification cases, with appeals to the court of appeals. The standards of judicial review are similar
for both types of appeal. See infra notes 420 & 421. The different appellate jurisdictions have
caused some difficulty for appellants. Compare North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office v. Ingram, 35 N.C. App. 578, 242 S.E.2d 205 (1978) (affirming superior court judgment reversing Commissioner Ingram's order where superior court had jurisdiction), with North Carolina Fire Ins.
Rating Bureau v. Ingram, 29 N.C. App. 338, 224 S.E.2d 229 (1976) (vacating superior court restraining order, because appeal was solely to the court of appeals, which noted that proper remedy
was to seek writ of supercedeas from it). See also American Guar. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 32
N.C. App. 552, 233 S.E.2d 398 (1977), cert. denied, 292 N.C. 729, 235 S.E.2d 782 (1977) (affirming
superior court order restraining Commissioner Ingram from enforcing rules promulgated by him);
North Carolina Auto. Rate Office v. Ingram, 30 N.C. App. 596 (1976) (unpublished order vacating
superior court order because appeal was solely to the court of appeals, in which the court of
appeals noted that it has the power to issue such writs as it considers necessary to prevent substantial injustice pending perfection of an appeal); North Carolina Auto. Rate Office v. Ingram, 29
N.C. App. 421, 224 S.E.2d 308 (1979) (unpublished order vacating superior court restraining order, because appeal was solely to the court of appeals).
419. See, eg., State ex rel Comm'r v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 394-96, 269
S.E.2d 547, 559 (1980).
420. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-9.6 (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides for scope of review in appeals
pursuant to id § 58-9.4 as follows:
(a) On appeal the court shall review the record and the exceptions and assignments of error in accordance with the rules of the Court of Appeals, and any alleged
irregularities in procedures before the Commissioner, not shown in the record, shall be
considered under the rules of the Court of Appeals.
(b) So far as necessary to the decision and where presented, the court shall decide
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning and applicability of the terms of any action of the Commissioner. The
court may affirm or reverse the decision of the Commissioner, declare the same null and
void, or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the appellants have been prejudiced because the Comnissioner's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional provisions, or
(2) In excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Commissioner, or
(3) Made upon lawful proceedings, or
(4) Affected by other errors or law, or
(5) Unsupported by material and substantial evidence in view of the
entire record as submitted, or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious.
(c) In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party and due account shall be taken
of the rule of prejudicial error. The appellant shall not be permitted to rely upon any
grounds for relief on appeal which were not set forth specifically in his notice of appeal
filed with the Commissioner.
(d) The court shall also compel action of the Commissioner unlawfully withheld
or unlawfully or unreasonably delayed.
(e) Upon any appeal, the rates fixed or any rule, regulation, finding, determination, or order made by'the Commissioner under the provisions of this Chapter shall be
prima facie correct.
421. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51 (Cum. Supp. 1981) provides:
The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further
proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the

NORTH CA4ROLIN.4 LAW REVIEW[

[Vol. 61

applied to the extent they are consistent, 4 22 but the Administrative Procedure
Act controls. 423 The standard foremost on each battlefront has been whether
Commissioner Ingram's actions were in excess of statutory authority. 424 His
reach has exceeded his grasp, as each quest for substantive rate-making power
has been rebuked by the courts.425 Procedurally, however, his power extends
to broad areas of admissibility 426 and credibility of evidence4 27 and to basic
rulemaking. 428 Of course, proper proceedings and procedures are required,4 29
petitioners may have been prejudiced because the agency findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency;
or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under G.S.
150A-29(a) or G.S. 150A-30 in view of the entire record as submitted; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious.
If the court reverses or modifies the decision of the agency, the judge shall set out in
writing, which writing shall become a part of the record, the reasons for such reversal or
modification.
422. See, eg., State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 395,
269 S.E.2d 547, 559 (1980).
423. Id
424. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 58-9.4 (Cum. Supp. 1981) with id 150A-51 (Cum. Supp.
1981).
425. See State exre. Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 292 N.C. 1,
231 S.E.2d 867 (1977) (the 1974.4utomobile Liability Filing case); State ex re. Comm'r of Ins. v.
North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 287 N.C. 192, 214 S.E.2d 98 (1975) (the Energy Crisis
Case).
426. See, ag., State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 293
N.C. 365, 239 S.E.2d 48 (1977) (the House Bill28Automobile case). "Insurance data compiled by
the ... [rate bureau], insofar as it is shown to be reliable and fairly compiled is valuable and
should be considered. The Commissioner may also consider evidence, otherwise competent, from
other sources." Id at 384-85, 239 S.E.2d at 60.
427. See, eg., State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Insurance Rating Bureau,
292 N.C. 471, 234 S.E.2d 720 (1977). "The credibility of evidence,. . . and the weight to be given
such evidence, are to be determined by the Commissioner." Id at 489, 234 S.E.2d at 730. But
"the Commissioner may not act arbitrarily, rejecting as untrustworthy, for no stated or apparent
reason, uncontradicted testimony or data submitted through competent and unimpeached witnesses." Id In that case, there was no evidence in conflict with that presented by the rating
bureau and there was no cross-examination of witnesses testifying for its filing. The tables were
turned in 1980 InsuranceCaseI, in which the rate bureau did not contest the single expert witness,
a member of Commissioner Ingram's staff, testifying on auditing of data. 300 N.C. at 405, 269
S.E.2d at 564. Under the whole record test for determining whether substantial evidence supports
the Commissioner's findings, the appellate court may nevertheless reverse the Commissioner's
order. See id, 269 S.E.2d at 564-65. An example occurred in 1974AutomobileLiability Filing, in
which the supreme court rejected findings based upon what it regarded as "questionable deductions" on driving habits. 292 N.C. at 20, 231 S.E.2d at 877. They related to the witness' "conclusion that unemployment would keep people from drinking in bars in a state which [did not then]
allow legalized sale of liquor by the drink." Id The court, through common sense, rejected the
witness' "dubious conclusion that a man who becomes intoxicated in his home will remain in his
abode." Id
428. See State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 300 N.C. 381, 400-04,
269 S.E.2d 547, 561-63 (1980) (1980InsuranceRate Case 1). "[W]e think it without question that
our Legislature intended for the Commissioner of Insurance to promulgate such reasonable rules
and regulations as he deems necessary to discharge the functions of his office ... " Id at 400,
269 S.E.2d at 562.
429. Id at 408, 269 S.E.2d at 566.
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but Commissioner Ingram generally has neither provided nor followed
them.430 The courts have found the Commissioner's orders to be "unsupported by material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record. '43 1
432
They have found his orders to be "arbitrary or capricious."
Nevertheless, the courts have not, as suggested by another commentator,4 33 "displayed an uncharacteristic willingness to 'control and direct' the
operations of" Commissioner Ingram. 4 34 Even the court of appeals' strongest
criticism of the Commissioner did not suggest control, 435 as the supreme
court's softening of the criticism made clear.436 In the rate cases with the most
compelling arguments for extraordinary relief, the Commissioner's actions
were not controlled and directed by the courts.437 The closest semblance to
court control over the Commissioner's actions has come not in rate cases with
430. See, e.g., id at 408-19, 269 S.E.2d at 566-73.
431. See, e.g., id at 430-34, 269 S.E.2d at 580.
432. See, e.g., id at 420-21, 269 S.E.2d at 573.
433. Markham, supra note 265.
434. Id at 25.
435. See State ex ret Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 30 N.C. App.
549, 228 S.E.2d 264 (1976), atdinpart,rev'dinpart,292 N.C. 471, 234 S.E.2d 720 (1977) (homeowner's insurance "deemer" clause case). The court of appeals had found unchallenged and uncontradicted evidence supporting a proposed increase of an existing rate that had been shown to
be "unfair and confiscatory." 30 N.C. App. at 558, 228 S.E.2d at 270. It then acted as follows:
Since the record on appeal discloses persistent procrastination, unfairness, and partisan
procedures and decisions on the part of the Commissioner, we, in the exercise of the
inherent power of the court, do not invalidate the effected 16.2% rate increase by the
Rating Bureau. We, therefore, continue in effect this rate increase until the Commissioner of Insurance performs his statutory duty in further proceedings and fixes premium
rates for homeowners insurance which will produce a fair and reasonable profit and no
more.

Id
436. The supreme court, "without impugning the motives of the Commissioner, and without
intent to express concurrence in the characterization by the Court of Appeals of his actions and
inactions with reference to this and other rate filings ... " 292 N.C. at 490, 234 S.E.2d at 730,
took another approach:
The Court of Appeals was in error in continuing in effect the rates proposed in the filing
"in the exercise of the inherent power of the court." Neither the Court of Appeals nor
this Court has the inherent power to fix rates ofinurancepremiun. These are fixed by
the filing of the Bureau, pursuant to the "deemer provision" in G.S. 58-13 1.1, subject to
the authority of the Commissioner, by a properly supported order, issued after a hearing
as prescribed by the statutes, to approve or disapprove such rates in whole or in part,
and, if they be disapproved in whole or in part, to fix for the then future the rates to be
charged.

The order issued by the Commissioner disapproving the filing here in question does not
so comply with the statutory procedures in the respects above set forth and, therefore, the
judgment
of the
Appealsinvacating
is hereby affirmed. The conse- °
quence is that
theCourt
rates of
proposed
the filingthat
andorder
set into
effect by the "deemer provision" remain presently in effect and will so remain in effect until change by a lawfully
issued order of the Commissioner or by a further filing.
Id at 493, 234 S.E.2d at 732 (emphasis added).
437. See, ag., State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 30 N.C.
App. 549, 228 S.E.2d 264 (1976), qfidinpar, rev'd inpart, 292 N.C. 471, 234 S.E.2d 720 (1977);
State exrel Comm'r of Ins. v. Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau, 36 N.C. App. 98, 242
S.E.2d 887 (1978), and before remand, 30 N.C. App. 332, 226 S.E.2d 822 (1976); State ex ret.
Comm'r of Ins. v. Compensation Rating and Inspection Bureau, 28 N.C. App. 409, 221 S.E.2d 96
(1976); see also State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 40 N.C. App. 85, 252
S.E.2d 811 (1979), cert. denied, 297 N.C. 452, 256 S.E.2d 810 (1979).
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direct appeal to the appellate division but in two other settings with initial
appeals to the superior court;4 38 both cases involved arbitrary or capricious
actions by the Commissioner and appropriate judicial relief.4 39 At all appellate levels, even amid confusing situations, the courts have exercised their jurisdiction carefully.440
Moreover, in sweeping dicta in its most recent rate-related case, the Recoupment Surcharges Case, the supreme court displayed its disdain for "disputes . . . far too numerous" and "this unfortunate trend to administer the
insurance laws of our state before the Courts."'44 1 Lamenting this "piecemeal
construction," the court noted that "during the past eight years, the appellate
division has issued over thirty opinions resulting from actions before the Commissioner of Insurance." 442 "[A]Imost quarterly decisions from the judicial
branch of government are required." 4 43 To cure this extensive litigation, the
court has not presumed to control and direct the Commissioner, but has prescribed a legislative expression of "intent in language which is crystal
clear." 444 The court continues to conclude, even after the 1977 Rating Law,
revision appears to offer more likelihood of future
"that legislative
'' " 5
harmony.
438. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 34 N.C. App. 619, 240 S.E.2d 332 (1977); North
Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Ingram, 79 CVS 2577, General Court of
Justice, Superior Court Division, Wake County, North Carolina, appeal dismissed, N.C. Court of
Appeals, No. 8010SC537, July 8, 1981.
439. In Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 34 N.C. App. 619,240 S.E.2d 332 (1977), the court
of appeals upheld a mandatory injunction issued by the superior court requiring Commissioner
Ingram to approve a plan submitted by an insurance company for exchange of its stock for the
stock of a holding company. The court of appeals affirmed findings that Commissioner Ingram
had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in disapproving the plan of exchange, when he failed even
to read the petition for weeks, rendered a decision only when compelled to do so by another court
order, based his order on findings totally unsupported by any evidence, and refused to make
favorable findings that were "fully supported by a mass of convincing and uncontradicted evidence." 34 N.C. App. at 635, 240 S.E.2d at 469. "If, as here, he acts arbitrarily, petitioners are not
left helpless, nor are the courts powerless to grant them appropriate relief." Id at 636, 240 S.E.2d
at 470. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-51 (Cum. Supp. 1981),
"the court is given the power not only to reverse but also to modifIy a final agency decision fthe
substantialrightsof thepetitionersmay have been prejudicedbecause the agencyfindings or conclusions are arbitraryand capricious." Id at 637, 240 S.E.2d at 470 (emphasis added). In North
Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Ingram, 79 CVS 2577, General Court of
Justice, Superior Court Division, Wake County, North Carolina, appealdismissed, N.C. Court of
Appeals, No. 8010SC537, July 8, 1981, the Guaranty Association elected a person to fill a vacancy

on its Board of Directors and, as required by statute, submitted the election to Commissioner
Ingram for his approval. Commissioner Ingram disapproved the election without giving any reasons, and, after discovery and a request for an administrative hearing or declaratory ruling, refused to hold a hearing or to issue a declaratory ruling. The superior court found that the
disapproval was arbitrary and capricious. It reversed the order of Commissioner Ingram disapproving the election, and ordered that "said election shall be deemed approved by the Commissioner of Insurance" and that the person "shall be allowed to serve as a member of the Guaranty
Association Board of Directors pending any appeal of this Court's order." Record on Appeal, at
65. The matter became moot and the appeal was dismissed.
440. See supra note 418.
441. 302 N.C. at 296-97, 275 S.E.2d at 410.
442. Id at 296, 275 S.E.2d at 410.
443. Id at 296-97, 275 S.E.2d at 410.
444. Id at 298, 275 S.E.2d at 411.
445. Id at 296, 275 S.E.2d at 410.
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Whatever "formula" or "clear and unmistakable language" the General
Assembly may write at the supreme court's suggestion, 44 6 the cases between
Commissioner Ingram and the companies likely will continue,44 7 despite the
courts' disdain for them. Should appropriate relief not be available at the
appellate division in administrative rate cases, inadequate rates may result in
direct challenges of allegedly confiscatory rates, 4 4 8 posing problems of

proof,449 theory, 450 and judicial power.4 5 1 Perhaps the "Hornbook" will add
454
innew chapters on confiscation, 452 regulatory bias, 453 judicial remedies,
4 56
455
In any event, the
and possible federal preemption.
cluding federal ones,
"Hornbook" likely will grow. Indeed, as the supreme court said in 1980 Insur446. Id at 297, 275 S.E.2d at 411.
447. See, e.g., State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 55 N.C. App. 734,
290 S.E.2d 234 (1982); State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 54 N.C. App.
601, 284 S.E.2d 339 (1981); State ex rel Comm'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 52 N.C.
App. 79, 277 S.E.2d 844 (1981); North Carolina Rate Bureau v. Ingram, 81 CVS 8374, 81 CVS
7678, 81 CVS 7478, & 81 CVS 6553, General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, Wake
County, North Carolina.
448. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ingrain, 290 N.C. 457,226 S.E.2d 498 (1976). Cf.
Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 270 N.C. 454, 155 S.E.2d 118 (1967).
449. In HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co. v. Ingram, the companies introduced extensive
evidence that the rates were confiscatory, including expert testimony of a consulting actuary. See,
eg., Record at 258-71. In the Recoupment Surcharges Case, the counterclaiming companies and
the Facility filed affidavits regarding Facility losses, and the counterclaiming companies through
discovery established that the plaintiffs had no contrary evidence regarding the losses. Record at
303, State ex rel Hunt v. North Carolina Reinsurance Facility, 302 N.C. 274, 275 S.E.2d 399
(1981). See also cases cited supra note 95.
450. See notes 87-95 and accompanying text supra.
451. See, eg., Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Ingram, 290 N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498
(1976). See also cases cited supra note 95 and infra note 455. For a broad statement of a court's
authority to enter interlocutory relief pending a final determination in a rate proceeding in which
the existing rates are challenged as confiscatory, see Northern States Power Co. v. City of St. Paul,
99 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1959).
452. See note 93 and text accompanying notes 409-15 supra.
453. See cases cited in and text accompanying notes 396-408 supra. See generaly Kennedy,
Remediesfor Abuse of Regulatory Powers of an Insurance Commissioner, 13 FORUM 416 (1978).
454. See cases cited in notes 93, 435, 436, 438, & 439 supra.
455. In North Carolina Reinsurance Facility v. Ingram, Civil Action No. 77-0034-CIV-5
(E.D.N.C.), the plaintiffs' challenges to allegedly confiscatory rates included claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1981). The counterclaims in the Recoupment Surcharges Case also included claims
under § 1983. See, e.g., Record at 102-03, State ex rel Hunt v. North Carolina Reinsurance
Facility, 302 N.C. 274, 275 S.E.2d 399 (1981). Compare Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 472
F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1973), with C.M. Clark Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Maxwell, 479 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir.
1973), and C.M. Clark Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Reed, 390 F. Supp. 1056 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
456. Ironically, the state statutory scheme, originally a state-action avoidance of federal antitrust acts, itself could become a casualty on the "battleground," caught in the crossfire and boobytrapped in the antitrust minefield. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 242 F. Supp. 73, 81 (E.D,N.C.
1965), aef'd, 361 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 930 (1966), and text accompanying
notes 80-82 supra. Allstate held that a North Carolina statutory ratemaking scheme was not preempted by federal antitrust acts. In the Recoupment Surcharges Case plaintiffs alleged that the
surcharges resulted from an alleged conspiracy in violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (Cum.
Supp. 1981). Although they made no contention that the alleged conspiracy violated any federal
law in response to the companies' discovery, they argued on appeal that it violated the Sherman
Act. Compare Record at 303, with Appellants' Brief at 43, State ex rel Hunt v. North Carolina
Reinsurance Facility, 302 N.C. 274, 275 S.E.2d 399 (1981). In that argument, the plaintiffs
ignored Allstate and were apparently unaware of the federal preemption implications of their
argument. See Appellees' Brief at 69-73.
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such disputes is, of course, the proper function of the
ance Case I, "resolving
457
appellate courts."

457. 300 N.C. at 390, 269 S.E.2d at 552.

